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ARTICLE 
Citizen Participation in the Making of 
Environmental Decisions: 
Evolving Obstacles and Potential Solutions 
Through Partnership With Experts and 
Agents 
MARC B. MIHALY*
INTRODUCTION 
 
Many public officials, whether city zoning administrators, 
city council persons, state air pollution control board members, 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rule makers, or 
commissioners of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 
share a career reality: they spend some substantial portion of 
their working lives hearing or reading testimony submitted by 
members of the public, citizens who are not lawyers, not 
professional stakeholder staff, and not trained experts in the 
matter at hand.  I spent the better part of three decades as an 
attorney for both environmental citizen advocates and 
governmental agencies, and have concluded that such citizen 
participation is essential to our democratic experiment, especially 
in the current effort to ensure that a representative government 
can promote the socio-economic reorganization necessary to 
reduce carbon emissions. 
It is my experience, however, that while officials support 
vigorously the concept of citizen participation, they acknowledge 
privately that they rarely hear or read testimony from lay 
participants that changes their mind or adds substance to their 
 
*Associate Dean for the Environmental Law Program and Associate 
Professor of Law at Vermont Law School. Marc Mihaly, through his law firm, 
Shute, Mihaly & Weinberger, represented community groups, environmental 
organizations, local governments, and regional governmental entities in 
environmental, land use and energy matters. The author would like to thank 
Joshua Glubiak, Benjamin Leoni, and Peter Scully for their dedicated editorial 
assistance with this article. 
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determinations.  In testament to the power of an ideal and a 
conflicting reality to co-exist, officials show genuine support for 
the concept of citizen involvement and yet complain about lay 
testimony in private or wish for less of it.  They generally do not 
pursue the conflict or engage in serious inquiry into the 
inadequacies of citizen participation, the obstacles to valuable 
input, or potential for true melioration. 
This conceptual fog pervades especially the environmental, 
land use, and energy arenas, which present decision-makers with 
questions of both great public interest and great complexity.1  On 
the one hand, actors in the environmental endeavor remain 
dedicated, for reasons both historic and developmental, to the 
concept of the assertion of lay power, in part through citizen 
participation, despite recent accusations that the movement has 
lost its soul to technocratic leadership.2
This dedication to the participatory ideal, one I share, 
influences scholarly inquiry in the same way; reflexive and 
uncritical support takes the edge off analysis of important 
questions concerning the obstacles to citizen participation, and   
the utility of unassisted citizen participation in rulemaking, 
  However, the daunting 
complexity of the subject area and the underlying proceedings 
renders much unassisted lay participation useless.  This conflict 
between the ideal and the real, and the resulting cognitive 
dissidence, diminishes frank discussion of the barriers to effective 
citizen participation and a search for potential solutions. 
 
 1. See PANEL ON PUB. PARTICIPATION IN ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AND DECISION 
MAKING & THE NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND DECISION MAKING, 7 (Thomas Dietz & Paul C. 
Stern eds., 2008), available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id= 
12434 [hereinafter PUB. PARTICIPATION IN ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AND DECISION 
MAKING] (noting that “environmental decisions present very complex choices 
among interests and values, so that the choices are political, social, cultural, and 
economic, at least as much as the are scientific and technical”). 
 2. See, e.g., MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER & TED NORDHAUS, DEATH OF 
ENVIRONMENTALISM 6–11 (2004), available at http://www.thebreakthrough.org/ 
images/Death_of_Environmentalism.pdf (criticizing environmental leaders’ 
approach of “using science to define [a] problem as ‘environmental’ and crafting 
technical policy proposals as solutions,” and calling for a “collective step back to 
rethink everything”). Shellenberger & Nordhaus’ analysis misrepresents the 
environmental movement to date in this and many other respects. See Douglas 
A. Kysar, The Consultants Republic, 121 HARV. L. REV. 2041 (2008) (reviewing 
Shellenberger & Nordhaus’ next and similar book BREAK THROUGH: FROM THE 
DEATH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM TO THE POLITICS OF POSSIBILITY (2007)). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/6
MIHALY  
2009-10] CITIZEN PARTICIPATION 153 
permitting and legislation.  The literature falls roughly into two 
categories.  Many participation proponents tend to focus on 
methods to increase participation in environmental matters 
without giving sufficient attention to the obstacles.  A recent 
study conducted largely by social scientists is typical; in nearly 
250 pages of analysis of public participation in environmental 
decision-making, fewer than ten are devoted to the formidable 
problems, which currently make most unassisted citizen 
participation unhelpful to public officials and ineffectual.3
Attorneys suffer from a similar tendency to let the 
participatory ideal dull their sensibilities.  One would think that 
of all the actors in the decision-making play, the attorneys would 
have the clearest heads on this issue.  It is they, after all, who 
often bring procedural, substantive and political expertise to lay 
testimony.  However, attorneys seem to experience as much as 
any participant the distraction derived from the unexamined 
archetype of citizen participation.  One sees it in social situations 
where attorneys who represent local citizens in environmental 
and land use matters recount wonderful moments when 
community clients decimate the opposition with colorful or 
insightful testimony.  Along with another legal aid attorney in 
the mid-1970’s, I represented a group of low-income 
environmentalists opposed to a large residential “new town” 
south of San Francisco on a combination of gentrification and 
environmental grounds.  In front of an audience of nearly one 
thousand attendees, testimony before the planning commission 
addressed many issues, most related to intensification of use, 
traffic, and open space.  The developer’s attorney repeatedly 
emphasized his client’s proposed dedication of hundreds of acres 
for recreational use.  None of my arguments concerning the 
steepness of the dedicated land and its inappropriateness for 
passive recreation approached the devastation wrought by my 
clients who, in their testimony, exclaimed to the planning 
commissioners: “We think the land proposed for dedication would 
be useful, and here’s the user!”  They then led a small Billy goat 
down the central isle of the auditorium.  She bleated loudly.  
Every subsequent mention of the dedication brought laughter, 
 
 
 3. PUB. PARTICIPATION IN ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AND DECISION MAKING, supra 
note 1, at 52-58, 60-62 (discussing formidable problems which make most 
unassisted citizen participation unhelpful to public officials and ineffectual). 
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and, of course, the silent recitation in the listener: “Oh yes, the 
Billy goat land.” 
Why do we love to tell such stories?  It is because, as is often 
the case with stories, the desire to perpetuate and strengthen 
foundational myths animates the telling more than reality.  Even 
professional participants need, at some level, to believe in a 
special or redemptive value of lay participation.  Yet, as most of 
us who practice public participation law know, in environmental 
cases members of the general public rarely prepare or present the 
effective public comment and testimony.  It is the class of 
professionals, usually attorneys and the consultant experts they 
retain, who conceive, write (or edit), and orchestrate the 
presentation of public testimony.  In their absence, for reasons 
discussed in this article, testimony frequently misses statutory or 
regulatory deadlines, fails to raise the issues necessary to 
exhaust administrative remedies, emphasizes policy issues of 
concern to the testigant, rather than the decision-maker, and 
makes points without foundation.  
Such shortcomings form some of the basis for the other trend 
in the literature, an opposition to enhanced citizen participation, 
some of it scholarly and much political.4  Rationalists and 
representatives of economic stakeholders argue that citizen 
participation, based on intuition rather than science, and 
intrinsically parochial in nature, must be curtailed to allow 
government to function, as it should.5  These critics, motivated by 
doubts about the intrinsic worth of citizen participation in the 
scholarly case, or by opposition to its successes in the political 
case, focus on the incapacities of unassisted lay participation.  
They fail to evaluate adequately (or oppose), approaches to 
enhancing the sophistication and effectiveness of citizen 
participation. 6
We need to think further than participatory ideals, and yet 
more sympathetically to participation than its critics.  What are 
 
 
 4. See PUB. PARTICIPATION IN ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AND DECISION MAKING, 
supra note 1, at 54-58 (summarizing such opposition). 
 5. See discussion infra Part II.B and notes 24-27 and accompanying text.  
 6. The key is provision of attorneys and experts to citizen advocates. Efforts 
such as Legal Aid, attorneys’ fees statutes, and enhanced standing have been 
long opposed, with substantial success, by economic and political actors on the 
right. See infra note 223 and accompanying text.  
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/6
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the true obstacles to citizen participation? Is modern 
environmental decision-making susceptible to effective unassisted 
lay participation? Who does most of the participation in the 
environmental arena? This article addresses these issues from a 
qualitative perspective,7
Part I of this article briefly reviews theories of public 
participation and contends that, regardless of the underlying 
political theory applied, the valuable societal benefits of public 
participation accrue only where the involvement makes a true 
difference in the decision-making process.  Part II examines the 
developing obstacles to unassisted citizen involvement.  I propose 
that in this era of implementation, environmental decisions 
present issues sufficiently complex that lay participation cannot 
successfully affect environmental decision-making unless assisted 
by attorneys and experts.  This complexity combines with the 
evolution of environmental decision-making, away from 
traditional public processes, toward contract and private 
stakeholder negotiations, to render unassisted citizen 
participation problematic and ineffectual.  Utilizing the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) as an example of these 
obstacles, Part III contrasts the participatory ideals embodied in 
the structure of the Act with the reality of formalized and 
ineffectual participation regimes designed by compliance 
bureaucracies and communications consultants.  Finally, Part IV 
examines the benefits of a productive citizen-attorney-expert 
team in the context of NEPA, in formal environmental 
proceedings, and in informal processes such as negotiated 
rulemaking, suggesting regimes by which such representation 
could be provided. 
 and then addresses means to enhance 
effective participation by lay citizenry, specifically contending 
that the potential societal benefits of citizen participation accrue 
where participants partner with experts and agents, usually 
attorneys.   
 
 
 
 7. Although a more quantitative analysis would be most beneficial, the 
diversity of underlying issues, processes, and actors makes many such analyses 
actually anecdotal and pose daunting obstacles to a meaningful empirical 
analysis. 
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I.   THE BENEFITS OF PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING ARE 
DIVERSE, BUT MATERIALIZE ONLY IF THE 
PARTICIPATION HAS ACTUAL EFFECT. 
A.  Theories of Democracy and Participation 
We must begin where most thought on participation resides.  
What are the benefits of public participation?  The positives of 
public involvement are the subject of too many paeans, 
publications, law review articles, and appellate opinions to cite 
fully,8
The model which is sometimes labeled rationalist, scientific, 
progressive or synoptic, is one of the oldest.  It conceives 
government as led by persons who are neutral and wise, and 
seeking the common good.  The common good, in turn, represents 
a determinable concept consisting, in its most modern 
incarnation, of the highest utility for the greatest number of 
citizens.
 but they are briefly set out below.  Before reaching the 
benefits, one must start with the theories of participation.  These 
in turn flow from one’s view or model of modern democracy. 
9
 
 8. See, e.g., PUB. PARTICIPATION IN ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AND DECISION 
MAKING, supra note 1; Mark Stephen Squillace, Embracing a Civic Republican 
Tradition in Natural Resources Decision-Making, (U. of Colo. Law Sch. Research 
Paper No. 08-02, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1082008; Thomas 
Dietz, Theory and Method in Social Impact Assessment, SOCIOLOGICAL INQUIRY 
54, 54-69 (1987); THOMAS C. BEIERLE & JERRY CAYFORD, DEMOCRACY IN PRACTICE: 
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS (2002); FAIRNESS AND 
COMPETENCE IN CITIZEN PARTICIPATION 17 (Ortwin Renn, Thomas Webler & 
Peter Wiedeman eds., 1995); Ernest Gellhorn, Public Participation in 
Administrative Proceedings, 81 Yale L.J. 359, 361 (1972) (describing the many 
social advantages of public participation in administrative proceedings); Eliot S. 
Metzger & John M. Lendvay, Commentary, Seeking Environmental Justice 
Through Public Public Participation, 8 ENVTL. PRACTICE 104 (2006); Scenic 
Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 
1965) (holding that there are many public interests, and that the governmental 
agency alone could not protect these interests).  
  Advocacy of such a government of mandarins emerged 
as one line of thought in the post-Civil War Republican Party, 
matured during the Progressive Era, and found a modern 
instrumentality in the administrative agencies brought to fruition 
 9. Jonathan Poisner, A Civic Republican Perspective on the National 
Environmental Policy Act’s Process for Citizen Participation, 26 ENVTL. L. 53, 57 
(1996).   
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/6
MIHALY  
2009-10] CITIZEN PARTICIPATION 157 
in the Roosevelt administrations.10
Commencing in the 1950’s (though some say, as early as 
Madison) and still quite pervasive today, the pluralist ideal 
contends that the common good does not exist as an independent 
set of solutions objectively determinable by any leaders, be they 
wise and knowledgeable, or otherwise.
  Public participation finds 
value in such a model to the extent that it provides new and 
valuable factual, theoretical or legal input to these technocratic 
decision-makers, input which they could not obtain through the 
exercise of their own expertise.  
11  Rather, the common 
good emerges as a result of the bargaining of the issue-relevant 
set of economic and social interest groups.12 Ideal governmental 
processes provide a forum for the negotiation, and ideal decisions 
reflect the results of that bargaining.13
More collectively oriented advocates emphasize that the 
common good in a democracy represents much more than a 
solution reached by wise leaders or negotiation to reach an 
optimized highest good for the greatest number of individuals.  
  Public participation in 
such a model means effective representation of all interests 
relevant to the policy issue in question. 
 
 10. KENNETH F. WARREN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM, 83, 
fig. 3.2 (Westview Press 4th ed. 2004) (1982); ROBERT KELLEY, BATTLING THE 
INLAND SEA (1989) (A brilliant evocation of the scientific element in the pre-Civil 
War Republican party and its efforts to find solutions to repeated flooding in the 
Central Valley of California). 
 11. See generally, WILLIAM KELSO, AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC THEORY: PLURALISM 
AND ITS CRITICS (1978); Frank Pasquale, Reclaiming Egalitarianism in the 
Political Theory of Campaign Finance Reform, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 631 
(2008). 
 12. See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term: Traces of Self-
government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 21 (1986); Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in 
American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 32 (1985). 
 13. See Tonia Novitz & Phil Syrpis, Assessing Legitimate Structures for the 
Making of Transnational Labour Law: The Durability of Corporatism, 35 INDUS. 
L.J. 367, 372 (2006). Novitz & Syrpis note that   
[t]he central pluralist idea, associated with the notion of participatory 
democracy, is that diverse entrenched interests do not dissipate on the 
election of national or local government by majority vote, but continue to 
exist and can covertly influence policy-making at all levels. This idea leads 
to a call for representation of interest groups at various levels of 
government decision-making, so as to ensure that all those directly 
affected, not only those with the greatest capital or social influence, can be 
heard.  
Id.  
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For these advocates, contending under various labels, including 
Civic Republicans or Universalists, the goal of government 
includes fostering civic values in its citizens, embracing the 
significant value of the concept of a common good, independent of 
individual interests.14  Civic Republicans propose a more complex 
and iterative view of public participation under which the act of 
participation in government itself creates and changes values and 
thus interests, rather than simply reflecting ex ante values and 
interests.15  In this view, public participation has value not only 
for the information it imparts to decision-makers, but also from 
its educational value and transformative effect on the 
participant.16
B.  Democratic and Participatory Theories in the 
Environmental Context 
 
Interestingly, the attributes of ideal public participation 
necessary under each of these disparate views of democracy17
The scientific, rationalist model has a special, perhaps 
unique, place for environmental decision-making because the 
environmental endeavor contends continuously with the conflict 
between the existing demands of human society and the biological 
and physical constraints of the earth.  The nature of the natural 
constraints may be debatable, but such constraints surely do exist 
as a reality independent of competing socio-economic actors, and 
are increasingly determinable through the application of 
 do 
not conflict, but rather overlap.  In other words, it is possible to 
create a cumulated set of elements for a participatory model that 
includes all of the required elements for each approach, although 
for each camp the list would be over-inclusive. This complement-
arity has significance here because one needs all of these loosely 
defined democratic theories to explain the exceptional value of 
citizen participation to environmental decision-making in our 
democracy.  None of the theories, alone, will suffice.  
 
 14. Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE. L.J. 1539, 1554-
55 (1988); see generally ERIK  OLSON, CIVIC REPUBLICANISM AND THE PROPERTIES 
OF DEMOCRACY (2005); Squillace, supra note 8, at 11-12. 
 15. See Michelman, supra note 12, at 27. 
 16. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 14, at 1545, 1587.  
17. I find these three paradigms useful, but there are others. See, e.g., PUB. 
PARTICIPATION IN ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AND DECISION MAKING, supra note 1, at 49. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/6
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established scientific methodologies.18  It is true that in many 
other arenas, a government develops policy in light of what are at 
least perceived as external “realities”—the laws of science and, at 
least arguably, the observed or mathematically deduced “laws” of 
economics.19  But the biosphere imposes constraints that are 
different in pervasiveness, flexibility and scale.  As to 
pervasiveness, carrying capacity limitations operate at all levels, 
from tiny landscapes (as to, for example, species protection),20 to 
regions (as to water and air pollution prevention),21 to the planet 
(as to carbon),22 forcing the environment onto the agenda of 
nearly every realm of government.  As to flexibility, while society 
has great flexibility as to the amount of inequality, social and 
economic misfortune it will absorb, ecological limits simply are 
what they are, and it is essential that decision-makers discover 
and understand them.  As to results, global warming, and 
worldwide shortages of potable water, food and energy will 
present decision-makers with potentialities that transcend most 
endeavors.23
It has been frequently contended, however, that it is not 
citizen participation but instead expert staff and educated public 
officials who provide the information that assists governmental 
  Governmental entities that face such realities need, 
and thus will seek, information that assists them in assessing 
objective science regarding the impacts of policy alternatives. 
 
 18. See J. Geider et al., Forum, Primary Productivity of Planet Earth: 
Biological Determinants and Physical Constraints in Terrestrial and Aquatic 
Habitats, 7 GLOBAL CHANGE BIOL. 849 (2001). 
 19. TONY LAWSON, ECONOMICS AND REALITY 280 (Routledge 2002) (1997) 
(explaining how competing policy-oriented groups accept existing economic 
conditions).  
 20. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006); Nathan F. Sayre, The 
Genesis, History, and Limits of Carrying Capacity, 98 ANNALS ASS’N AM. 
GEOGRS., 120 (2008).  
 21. Clean Water Act 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006); Clean Air Act 42 U.S.C. § 7401 
(2006); Kyushik Oh et al., Determining development density using the Urban 
Carrying Capacity Assessment System, 73 LANDSCAPE URBAN PLANN. J. 1 (2005). 
 22. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC TECHNICAL 
PAPER VI, CLIMATE CHANGE AND WATER, 74 (Bryson Bates et al. eds., 2008)  
[hereinafter IPCC], available at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/public 
ations_and_data_technical_papers_climate_change_and_water.htm. See, e.g., 
American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 
2009); William E. Rees, Revisiting Carrying Capacity: Area-Based Indicators of 
Sustainability, 17 POPUL.ENV’T (1996), available at http://dieoff.org/page110. 
htm.  
 23. IPCC, supra note 22, at 41. 
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entities in assessing the objective science.  The arc of develop-
ment of the administrative state and its expert commission, from 
John Francis Adams to Louis Kahn, rests on the effort to seed 
government with expertise.24  Modern commentators have argued 
that public participation interferes with such expertise.  Such 
public involvement, they contend, can be counterproductive to the 
operation of good government, especially in the environmental 
arena where, for example, lay perceptions of hazardous risk 
contravene good science,25 and repeated citizen litigation distorts 
EPA’s priorities.26  As a believer in good government, I agree with 
many of these contentions.  I have seen the waste of time in 
content-less, repetitive and lengthy citizen comment.  A 
thoughtful reading of A Civil Action27
Yet it is my experience, and the experience of many of my 
colleagues in environmental advocacy, that insider staff and 
officials frequently need outsider citizen input to make them 
wise.  This is true in part because staff members are not privy to 
all information, and as argued in this article, good partnerships 
among citizens, experts and advocates can provide valuable new 
data and analysis.  It is especially the case in regimes where 
elected officials have values antithetic to good science and 
priorities heavily weighted towards the expressed positions of 
economically dominant stakeholders.  In such environments, 
expert staff members are pressured to select among facts and 
approaches to reach predetermined conclusions.  While such an 
ideologically charged environment may bring to mind a just past 
federal administration, it characterizes many state and local 
governments where campaign contributions of economic actors 
 leaves one mostly angry at 
the protagonist attorney, the supposed hero, and at the system 
that aids and abets his work, as he spends his and his client’s 
time, money, and emotional energy for nothing.  The real heroes 
of the story are the EPA bureaucrats who eventually promulgate 
effective standards for remediation. 
 
 24. THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION (1984) (providing an 
excellent history of the rise of the expert commission and its role in the 
regulatory state).  
 25. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE TOWARD EFFECTIVE 
RISK REGULATION, 33-39 (1993).  
 26. PUB. PARTICIPATION IN ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AND DECISION MAKING, supra 
note 1, 54-56, 64-66. 
 27. JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1996).  
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/6
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create political environments hostile to good environmental 
science. 
I represented a group of citizens untrained in energy matters 
against a 500kV line proposed as part of the California 
transmission system.28  The line was strongly supported by the 
applicant utility, San Diego Gas and Electric, and, most 
significantly by the staff of the Public Utility Commission and the 
California Independent System Operator (the entity that operates 
the California transmission grid and runs the wholesale 
electricity market).29  This expert staff contended that the line 
was strategically necessary to provide reliable power to San 
Diego, a region increasingly dependent on imported power due to 
air quality issues that prevented local power plant construction.30  
These utility experts and agency staff dismissed my clients’ 
concerns as limited to aesthetic and land use issues that would 
occur anywhere one tried to locate a line.  Somewhat to my 
surprise, my retained experts, one of whom had designed the Los 
Angeles transmission grid, informed me that the line was not a 
good project and not necessary for the region.  At the end of the 
two-year process, the hearing officer and the full Commission 
rejected the application on grounds that the applicant utility had 
failed to demonstrate that the line was necessary for either 
reliability or economic purposes.31
For every horror story of unintelligent, parochial citizen input, 
other stories show that such input forces information on staff and 
decision-makers who would not have faced it otherwise, because 
they were simply unaware, because they were pressured not to 
see, or because the information contravened their own ideologies.  
In this Article, I contend that the difference between repetitive, 
useless input and valuable input frequently lies in the quality of 
expertise provided to the citizen participant. 
  In fact, I believe, the line was 
proposed not for the interests of the San Diego consumer, but to 
meet the strategic needs of the utility’s parent company. 
 
 28. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. (U 902-E), Application 01-03-036 at 2  (Cal. 
Pub. Utils. Comm’n Mar. 23, 2001) (Application for Certificate of Public 
Convenience & Necessity). 
 29. Id. at 4-6.  
 30. Id. at 14-71. 
 31. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. (U 902-E), Decision 02-12-066 at 75 (Cal. Pub. 
Utils. Comm’n Dec. 19, 2002) (denying Certificate of Public Convenience & 
Necessity). 
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The pluralist view also has its place in the environmental 
context.  While there may exist an objectively determinable 
environmental good (the rationalist view), choices over the 
distribution of benefits and burdens of programs leading to that 
good will reflect bargaining among interests, reflecting the 
operation of the pluralists’ marketplace.  Further, the realities of 
human nature and of governmental operation favor aspects of 
pluralist views of participation if not the underlying theory of 
democracy.  Good policy flows from processes that give decision-
makers the benefit of conflicting views.  The environmental arena 
is marked by pervasive conflict over the application of theories, 
the underlying data, and disputes over how to incorporate the 
resulting uncertainty into decision-making.  On these matters, as 
any advocate knows, scientists, economists and other experts 
develop opinions influenced by ideology and experience.  Staff 
experts, who frequently aggregate around specific views 
themselves, cannot provide an adequate airing of these conflicts.  
The coherent articulation of each conflicting view requires a level 
of effort, expertise and funding most likely to be produced by an 
interested party.  Thus, while the pluralists’ relativism may fall 
before the unyielding realities of the ecosphere, an effective 
participation model must, as an instrumental matter, provide 
what the pluralists want—a forum where all relevant parties can 
assert their agendas.   
Finally, the transformative participatory experiences of the 
Civic Republican model have shaped the environmental 
movement.  My former law partners and I have participated in 
many campaigns where citizens first become activists, then 
successful organizers, and finally elected officials themselves—a 
process which shows a profound psychological change for which 
successful civic participation served as the agent.  The Civic 
Republicans are correct to assert that participation itself is an 
educator and a transformative force.  In my view, no experience 
so effectively moves people out of self and family centered lives 
into the civic world as successful participation in governmental 
decision-making.  The experience makes permanent changes in 
the outlook and ensuing lives of those who undertake it, creates 
new ideologies, new groupings of interests, and in turn, changes 
society itself. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/6
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The Civic Republican participatory model gains special 
relevance in the climate context.  The now central environmental 
effort to slow and then halt the increase in atmospheric CO2 
depends in significant part on the entrant of new groups with 
new political positions, a result which Civic Republicans contend, 
and I agree, can flow from participation.  The players in the 
pluralist marketplace tend to represent the same cast that 
participated in the articulation of the status quo.  A mere 
rearrangement of which of those existing actors prevails may 
have been adequate to continue progress in environmental arenas 
such as water contamination, control of traditional criteria air 
pollutants, and hazardous waste contamination.  The dimensions 
of the present climate concern, however, argue for more rapid 
socio-economic changes, both to reduce carbon emissions and to 
adapt to inevitable effects of climate change,32
Scientists are concluding that the threats posed by such 
carbon emissions are far greater than thought even recently; the 
problem, in the words of one prominent atmospheric scientist and 
public official, “has become an emergency.”
 and such changes 
require the entrance of new actors.  
33  Efforts to address 
the issue will require international collaboration for structural 
economic and social change on an unprecedented scale.  The 
provision, for example, of a minimally adequate energy supply to 
the world’s growing population while reducing the current 
atmospheric carbon load will require a reworking of what we 
consider a modern economy.34  A society engaged in such an 
endeavor needs new participants to contend in a determined 
manner for a position (here a common good) that is broadly felt 
and objectively determinable, but not represented with adequate 
force in the current array of organized interests.  When 
entrenched existing stakeholders dominate governmental 
processes, the status quo prevails, and substantial change 
becomes problematic.35
 
 32. See IPCC, supra note 22, at 45. 
  An evaluation of the cap-and-trade 
 33. Elizabeth Kolbert, Profile, The Catastrophist, THE NEW YORKER, June 29, 
2009, at 39 (quoting James Hansen). 
 34. E. ADAMS MILLER, COORDINATING GOVERNMENT AGENCY INVOLVEMENT IN 
CLIMATE CHANGE ISSUES, 2009 WL 1342291, at *1 (2009).   
 35. See PUB. PARTICIPATION IN ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AND DECISION MAKING, 
supra, note 1, at 61.  
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provisions of the Waxman-Markey bill indicates that the heavy 
hand of coal and utility interests weakened the bill to the point 
that it fails to make the changes necessary to reduce carbon 
emissions to acceptable levels, yet the bill only narrowly passed 
the House of Representatives.36
C.  The Composite Benefits of Participation 
  Any cap-and-trade scheme will 
be implemented at the federal, state and local level, and at each 
level, we will need the revised political and regulatory landscape 
that citizen participation can provide through the creation of new 
and effective stakeholders. 
Assembled here is an aggregation of benefits for a particip-
atory model derived from these varying theories of democracy.37
 
  
Public participation produces benefits to society because it: 
• Improves decisions by providing decision-makers with 
relevant and accurate information;  
• Helps decision-makers gauge the nature and depth of 
public opinion;  
• Introduces new concepts that staff or frequent participants 
may not advance;  
• Informs decision-makers of the substance, weight, 
significance and politics of stakeholder concerns in ways 
that staff cannot;  
• Provides an organizing device and political entrance vehicle 
for new stakeholders who, in turn, can reorder public 
priorities and advocate for new governing processes;  
• Provides a vehicle for public policy advocacy on the 
substantive issues which, in turn, may change the politics 
in question;  
• Fosters democratic and civic values;  
• Creates new group identities;  
• Confers legitimacy on the governmental process; 
 
 36. See American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. 
(1st Sess. 2009). 
 37. There are of course many other lists. See, e.g., PUB. PARTICIPATION IN 
ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AND DECISION MAKING, supra note 1, at 44. 
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• Enhances the depth and detail of news reporting on the 
subject, thus educating the general public; and  
• Counters corruption, collusion, and graft.  
Although perhaps tautological, public participation is also an end 
in itself, viewed as a significant element of a democratic society.38
As discussed above, not all democratic theorists care about 
all these elements.  Civic virtue and new group identities lack 
importance for Rationalists and Pluralists.  The search for an 
objective truth constitutes a dubious effort for Pluralists.  But, as 
discussed above, my view of the operation of democracy in the 
environmental arena requires a model of public participation that 
delivers this list of aggregate benefits.  
 
D.  Participation Must Effect Process and Outcome to 
Deliver Societal Benefits 
These aggregate benefits, however, begin rather than end the 
inquiry of this article.  When, we must ask, does participation 
actually deliver the benefits in the composite list?  I contend that 
the benefits of public participation accrue generally where the 
participation has effect.  Such effective participation alters the 
course of the subject process, by material change, or the 
substantial potential for material change to either the 
substantive outcome or to the underlying process.  Change to the 
underlying process is significant because it in turn may change 
the eventual outcome.   
Ineffective participation can provide some of the benefits in 
the composite list, although in an attenuated or ultimately 
unsuccessful manner.  It could be contended, for example, that 
impotent participation can perform a legitimizing function.39
 
 38. See D.J. Fiorno, Citizen Participation and Environmental Risk: A Survey 
of Institutional Mechanisms, 15 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 226, 239 (1990).  
  If 
participation is an end in itself, ineffective participation arguably 
might suffice.  Citizens do in fact prefer an ineffective voice to 
none at all; I have watched many individuals sit through long 
 39. “Participants may come to trust an agency when a participation process 
is conducted with the best of intentions by those officials directly responsible for 
it, even if the officials who will make decisions ignore what is learned from the 
process.” PUB. PARTICIPATION IN ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AND DECISION MAKING, 
supra note 1, at 52.  
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proceedings in order to deliver testimony that they (and everyone 
in the room) knew would have no effect on the outcome, just 
because they wanted to express themselves.  But my continuing 
relationship with those participants has generally revealed that 
the experience is frequently the last civic experiment, one leading 
to deep cynicism about the political system.  The legitimacy is 
thus more of a short-term “hit” rather than a long-term benefit.40
Perhaps the legitimizing benefit of the ineffective 
participation is greater among those who do not participate them-
selves.  While the ineffectual nature of the participation becomes 
apparent to the disappointed actors; members of the greater 
public, learning from the media that the matter was the subject of 
many meetings and contested proceedings, concludes that they 
too could have participated had they so chosen, and thus 
democracy has been served.  However, on some level most 
observers know they are watching a simulacrum, not the real 
thing.  As a normative matter, I contend that such an elevation of 
appearance over substance has a slow deleterious effect on civil 
society.  
 
For most purposes, however, participation must have effect, 
or the potential to have effect, in order to perform the ideal 
functions described in the cumulative list of benefits above.  
Regardless of which theory of democracy one applies, ineffective 
participation fails most of its functions.  It cannot effectively 
provide useful new evidence or concepts to decision-makers of a 
rationalist government seeking the public interest; it cannot 
effectively serve to advance the cause of a new stakeholder in the 
pluralist marketplace; it cannot provide the momentum for entry 
to new stakeholders; nor, can it perform the functions of 
legitimization and prevention of collusion.  In the long term, 
impotent participation will not operate to foster civic virtues, 
create new identities, or educate the public about how the country 
really works its way through difficult decisions.  
We are then led to the question of what constitutes effective 
participation.  In most complex, controversial, and contested 
environmental matters, effective participation requires content, 
presentation, and political acuity.  Content matters.  With 
important exceptions such as land use determinations in smaller 
 
 40. Id. (conceding that such legitimacy will be short lived). 
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jurisdictions, most environmental decision-makers enter their 
deliberations with substantial and sophisticated input.  Decisions 
on complex land development or redevelopment proposals, air or 
water pollution permit appeals, EPA rulemaking, or state Public 
Utility Commission decisions on a power line approval, both 
decisions on and off the record, with or without cross 
examination, all are likely to produce extensive technical 
testimony.41
It is true that in some situations, content may not matter 
and participation can have an effect by its mere presence even if 
it is amateurish, repetitive and without substance.  Decision-
makers may use participation as a simple (and possibly 
inaccurate) gauge of public sentiment.  The quantity, unilateral 
nature, or vehemence of citizen testimony may sway a decision-
maker in marginal or heavily politicized settings, especially 
where the ultimate decision-maker is comprised of elected 
officials.  Generally, however, as discussed infra, contrary 
evidence will be produced with the effect that unassisted lay 
participants who express conclusory opinions unsupported by a 
substantial factual underlay will have no material effect on the 
ultimate outcome. 
  Decision-makers facing renewal of a nuclear plant 
license, for example, expect regional opposition, but its repeated 
expression will constitute a mere backdrop to a determination 
based on a mix of financial, safety, and reliability issues.  In most 
such situations, the participation may be noted, but will not affect 
the outcome. 
Presentation determines outcome.  Citizens who do not 
understand the rules and customs of the forum will make 
presentations that have the appearance, if not the substance, of 
amateurism, and decision-makers will discount the material 
presented.42
 
 41. CASS SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 325 (1997) (evaluating 
whether the American approach to public law “[h]as promoted . . . democratic 
governance”). Sunstein notes that “[t]he technical complexity of underlying 
issues has contributed to the power of well-organized interest groups over the 
regulatory process.” Id.  
  Effective participants must make an educated guess 
as to the range of possible outcomes.  The decision-maker can 
tolerate using testimony, comments or other normal inputs to the 
 42. Id. at 325 (noting that “[i]n practice . . . democratic aspiration has often 
been defeated. People rarely have enough information to participate at all, or at 
all well, in the process of government.”). 
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proceeding to move decisions within a defined, if unexpressed 
range of possible outcomes; but if the desired outcome lies outside 
that range, the participants must alter the political landscape 
through sophisticated political and public relations advocacy 
campaigns, often, but not always, utilizing political consultants.  
Strong, accurate content, sophisticated presentation and 
political acuity are required even where the testimony (or another 
form of participation) is undertaken primarily for its political 
impact or organizing potential, rather than its substantive effect 
on decision-makers.  In most environmental conflicts, the existing 
stakeholders have become sophisticated and experienced actors.  
They anticipate citizen arguments and know how to counter 
them.  Organizational and political efforts succeed where the 
proponents know how to make telling points, are armed with good 
information, and understand the political context and the media.  
The media—assisted by the stakeholder proponents—will 
minimize citizen participation lacking in content, good 
presentation, and political acuity. 
Citizen participation needs agents (usually, but not 
necessarily, attorneys) and experts to provide the sophisticated 
content, presentation, and political acuity necessary to have 
effect.  Participation without such expertise will fail to change the 
process or contribute to the outcome of the subject proceeding, 
and thus will fail its democratic function.43  As discussed below, 
environmental decision-makers require technical input, which 
unassisted lay participants cannot provide.  Much of the decision-
making in the environmental arena has moved into quasi-private 
or private stakeholder negotiations, which pose barriers to 
unassisted lay participation.44  Even those processes created to 
facilitate citizen input, such as the NEPA, now provide avenues 
primarily for experts and agents who use the proceedings to 
process unassisted citizen input in ways which give it the form of 
participation without the substance.45  If citizens partner with 
experts, however, true effects on process and outcome are 
possible.46
 
 43. See infra Part II.A. 
  Such participation will bring with it the benefits 
citizen participation brings to society. 
 44. See infra Part II.B. 
 45. See supra Part I.B.  
 46. See infra Part IV. 
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
ENDEAVOR HAS INCREASED OBSTACLES TO 
EFFECTIVE CITIZEN PARTICIPATION. 
Before discussing approaches to improving citizen 
participation, we must start with a hard look at the true obstacles 
to citizen participation, an undertaking that literature on the 
subject generally does not perform.  Unfortunately, as the 
environmental endeavor has matured, and as we have success-
fully experimented with alternatives to traditional governmental 
processes for decision-making, the obstacles to unassisted lay 
participation have increased.   
A.  Decision-making Results from Proceedings too 
 Complex or Technical for Unassisted lay 
Participation. Experts and Attorneys Dominate 
such Arenas. 
The environmental effort has become dauntingly complex, an 
unavoidable result of its success.  Just as environmentalists have 
desired, the environment is now everything and almost no area of 
human endeavor lies apart from its reach.  The “environment” no 
longer functions, nor is viewed, as a distinct subject apart from 
the social and economic world; an environmental issue becomes 
joined to the underlying natural and social processes it involves.47  
Thus, the human endeavor to protect the environment has 
emerged as one of the most complex social efforts ever under-
taken.48
 
 47. See SCHELLENBERGER & NORDHAUS, supra note 2, at 32-33. Even in their 
context of their assertion of the limitations of environmentalism, Schellenberger 
and Nordhaus make the same point:  
  The resulting environmental regulation of necessity has 
 
The concepts of “nature” and “environment” have been thoroughly 
deconstructed . . . Why, for instance, is a human-made phenomenon like 
global warming—which may kill hundreds of millions of human beings 
over the next century—considered “environmental”? Why are poverty 
and war not considered environmental problems while global warming 
is? What are the implications of framing global warming as an 
environmental problem—and handing off the responsibility for dealing 
with it to ‘environmentalists’?”  
Id. at 12. 
 48. See generally PAUL HAWKEN, BLESSED UNREST: HOW THE LARGEST 
MOVEMENT IN THE WORLD CAME INTO BEING AND WHY NO ONE SAW IT COMING 
19
MIHALY  
170 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  27 
become as complex as the regulated activity, and now regulation 
itself is seen as a mere part of the redesign of society necessary to 
create a sustainable future.    
It has often been contended in scholarly literature that lay 
participation works best in situations where fundamental values 
are at stake, rather than in complex scientific or policy disputes 
which often related to implementation.49  Articulation and the 
establishment of new values marked the early years of the 
popular incarnation of the modern environmental movement.50  
Lay participants who often organized in grass roots ad hoc 
coalitions, led the early environmental efforts, mobilizing political 
pressure that made possible the odd coalitions behind 
Congressional legislation in the 1970’s to protect air and water 
quality, endangered species, federal land management, and 
related resources.51
Experts dominate, and will always dominate, these arenas.
  In the decades since, however, the increasing 
complexity of environmental issues has made those situations 
where values dominate the proceedings ever more scarce.  The 
environmental endeavor has transitioned from articulation of 
values and standards to an era of implementation, where complex 
policy, scientific, and economic concerns pervade almost all 
proceedings. 
52
 
(2007) (chronicling the genesis of the environmental movement and its 
implications for social justice); CAROLYN MERCHANT, THE COLUMBIA GUIDE TO 
AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY (2005) (a comprehensive history of 
American approaches to the environment); RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 47 (2004). 
  
As we moved, slowly at first, and more rapidly later, from 
 49. Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for 
Deliberative Agency DecisionMaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 226-227 (1997) 
(describing how “the expertise laden format of the EIS may lead agency 
decisionmakers to view themselves primarily as facilitating the objective 
transfer of information, rather than choosing fundamental values or assessing 
the quality and integrity of the information exchanged.”).  
 50. The environmental ethos is as old as civilization. Here I refer to the 
period post the publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring. See RACHEL 
CARSON, SILENT SPRING (Mariner Books 2002) (1962). 
 51. LAZARUS, supra note 48, at 92. 
 52. SUNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 325 (finding “[t]he technical complexity of 
underlying issues has contributed to the power of well-organized interest groups 
over the regulatory process.”); Rossi, supra, note 49, at 225 (observing that it is 
“[m]ore likely that interaction, to the extent it occurs, is confined to those who 
are the primary conveyors of scientific information—agency and nonagency 
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articulation of basic values, to fundamental legislation, and then 
into implementation, organizations of attorneys, scientists, and, 
later, economists and social scientists, such as the Natural 
Resources Defense Counsel, the Environmental Defense Fund, 
and the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund (now Earthjustice) 
emerged.53  This implementation endeavor requires solutions as 
sophisticated as the processes addressed, an effort that lies at the 
very boundaries of our social and scientific capabilities.54
The concerned citizen, the angry homeowner, or the 
consumer may predominate again when new issues arise, but not 
for long.  In the 1980’s, a decade after air and water quality 
efforts had moved from the domain of activists to experts, citizens 
led the fights to raise national consciousness over toxic 
contamination.
 
55  It is my observation, however, that the citizen 
activism on toxics quickly gave way to the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) and its implementation, first by cadres of new lawyers 
and then, somewhat to the dismay of lawyers, to teams of 
consulting scientists.  As lay participants develop new issues, the 
movement into implementation, and the accompanying rise of 
expertise, occurs with increasing swiftness.  The effort to address 
carbon, for example, originated from diffuse grass roots reactions 
to and propagation of scientific observation on a global scale, the 
epitome of lay effort.56
 
experts, or powerful interest groups who can afford to finance their own 
scientific research.”). 
  However, the endeavor quickly 
transitioned to one led by the expert staff and advocates of 
 53. See Natural Resource Defense Council, http://www.nrdc.org/ (last visited 
Dec. 20, 2009); Environmental Defense Fund, http://www.edf.org/home.cfm (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2009); Earthjustice, http://www.earthjustice.org (last visited 
Dec. 20, 2009). See also Stewart L. Udall, Symposium: the National Park 
System, Foreward, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 569, 570 (1997) (describing the 
conditions that “sparked the creation of aggressive national environmental law 
groups such as the Environmental Defense Fund and the Natural Resources 
Defense Council).   
 54. LAZARUS, supra note 48, at 47. 
 55. Zygmunt J.B. Platter, Environmental Law and Three Economies: 
Navigating a Sprawling Field of Study, Practice, and Societal Governance in 
Which Everything is Connected to Everything Else, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 359, 
382 n.54 (1999).  
 56. Dylan Golden, The Politics of Carbon Dioxide Emissions Reduction: The 
Role of Pluralism in Shaping the Climate Change Technology Initiative, 17 
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 171, 188-89 (1998-1999). 
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stakeholder non-profits, states, and nations.  Only those schooled 
in the arcane details of wholesale energy markets can fully 
understand why some versions of cap-and-trade would be so 
much less effective than others.57
It is in these decision-making arenas that this palpable need 
for expertise collides with our participatory ideals.  We are 
committed to citizen participation, and the more important the 
decision, the more we desire to know that the ordinary person can 
make a difference.  But the situational exigencies prevail: 
however strong our cultural and political beliefs may favor such 
unassisted lay participation, in practice it is the expertise that 
matters.
  This is appropriate to the 
issue; the growing complexity of both modern life and of 
environmental solutions requires the most sophisticated decision-
making processes we can devise, and those in turn should require 
the most knowledgeable expert input we can provide. 
58
B.   The Evolution of Environmental Decision-making 
Away from Legislation Towards Contract and 
Private Stakeholder Negotiations Makes 
Unassisted Lay Participation Problematic and 
Ineffectual. 
  Decision-makers, whether administrative law judges, 
corporate leaders or governmental officials, need expertise, and 
know that they need it.  The solution for those of us who believe 
in the value of citizen participation lies not in a naïve embrace of 
unassisted lay citizen advocacy, but rather in the ability to 
combine the energy and political value of a grass roots group with 
the expertise necessary to craft a message that will alter the 
course of an environmental decision-making process. 
We have traditionally associated public decision-making with 
legislative, regulatory and quasi-adjudicatory activity subject to a 
 
 57. Marc B. Mihaly, Recovery of a Lost Decade (or is it Three?): Developing the 
Capacity in Government Necessary to Reduce Carbon Emissions and Administer 
Energy Markets, 88 U. OR. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009). 
 58. See Yen-Chu Weng, Ph. D. candadite, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 
Conference Paper at the Human Flourishing and Restoration in the Age of 
Global Warming Conference: The Dynamics of Public Participation in Ecological 
Restoration: Analysis of Expert—Volunteer Relationships in Three Institutional 
Settings (Sept. 5, 2008) (discussing the unequal power hierarchy between lay 
and expert participation resulting in superficial public participation). 
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rich tradition of public participation.  Government, whether 
federal, state or local, pursues environmental initiatives through 
the creation of laws and regulations, and then through the 
application of laws and regulations to a regulated private sector.  
While it is true that the opportunities for participation in the 
legislative arena at the federal and state level are usually 
constrained to orchestrated committee testimony, the adoption of 
regulations, and rulemaking, whether formal or informal, and 
permitting proceedings are all subject to public input.59  At the 
local level, legislative efforts are equally open to participation.60
However, in the last few decades, the environmental arena 
has experienced a significant migration of decision-making away 
from these traditional regulatory and legislative arenas into 
consensual activities, sometimes private-private and often public-
private.
 
61  They usually take an initial form as a complex, multi-
party negotiation.  The results of the effort are then memorialized 
in some form of memorandum or contract.  These new forms of 
decision-making may mark an exciting evolution in polity and an 
interesting departure from prior models of government and 
collective action.62  They may provide new and flexible 
alternatives to rulemaking, regulatory, and administrative 
forums;63 but they also operate to reduce opportunities for 
effective public participation.64
What is the origin of this move towards agreement 
memorialized by contract, and the resulting decrease in the 
relevance of public input?  To a large extent, the move flows from 
 
 
 59. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).  
 60. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21003.1a (West 2009). 
 61. This migration commenced with negotiated rulemaking as a response to 
frustration with the time, expense, and failure of legitimacy in traditional 
rulemaking, but now has spread to other forms and forums, see discussion infra 
Part IV.C. See also Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for 
Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 7 (1982). 
 62. See id. 
 63. See id.  
 64. See William Funk, When Smoke Gets In Your Eyes: Regulatory 
Negotiation and the Public Interest—EPA’s Woodstove Standards, 18 ENVTL. L. 
55 (1987) (arguing that negotiating regulations subverts public participation 
and the public interest); see also infra text accompanying notes 192-98; but see 
Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy 
Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60 (2000) (arguing that consensual rulemaking 
increases the legitimacy of agency rulemaking). 
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the internal evolution of the underlying subject area.  In land use, 
water policy, endangered species, and multiple use discussions, 
for example, stakeholder negotiations are on the increase because 
of the substantive development of those areas of environmental 
endeavor.65
However, other factors that are common to all environmental 
issues are at play.  As discussed supra, environmental decision-
making has moved generally away from policy formulation where 
legislation and rulemaking, with their established notice, hearing 
and participation elements, predominate.  As we move to 
implementation, the internal dynamics of complexity, the breadth 
of the environmental concern, the level of detail, and the 
interdisciplinary nature of the issues operate to favor less formal 
stakeholder processes.  Implementation encourages resolution by 
methods responsive to multiple parties, multiple issues and to 
changing circumstances.  This, in turn, creates an advantage for 
efforts which start without established procedures, are responsive 
to complexity, and retain flexibility to adapt to the evolving 
situation; all of which are factors that favor negotiated solutions 
over more formal and thus “hard wired” processes such as 
legislation, regulation, or adjudication.
  Some of these are discussed more specifically infra. 
66
The rise of environmental expertise itself, aided by NEPA and 
its progeny,
 
67
Consider an example relating to the nation’s (now more than 
fifty year) effort to regulate air pollution.  The Clean Air Act 
(CAA) Amendments of 1970 contained the first federal mandate 
that states act to reduce levels of air pollution in polluted areas 
(now called “non-attainment areas”) down to contaminant levels 
set by the Environmental Protection Agency as necessary to 
 contribute to this movement towards negotiated 
solutions.  These statutes primarily empowered sophisticated 
stakeholders, who, operating through environmental profess-
ionals, have mastered the process, and have long ago decided who 
should be at the negotiating table and who they can safely ignore.  
 
 65. See Rossi supra note 49.  
 66. See Harter, Negotiating Regulations, supra note 61, at 29-30 (describing 
advantages of negotiations over traditional rulemaking, including flexibility to 
compromise and responsiveness to complicated competing interests). See also 
infra Part IV for a more detailed examination of experts and agents in the 
context of Negotiated Rulemaking.  
 67. See infra Part III.   
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protect the public health.68  In the initial years of the act, most 
actors did not understand the implications of the legislation, but 
they quickly learned.  For example, in 1972, a federal district 
court first considered the question of whether the CAA should be 
interpreted to also mandate the maintenance of the relatively 
pristine air quality in clean air areas (a concept called at the time 
“non-degradation”, now referred to in the statute as “non-
deterioration”).69  Despite the now-obvious impacts of such a 
policy on power generators who locate plants in clean air areas, 
no electric utility participated as amicus curiae in the case.  By 
the time the case reached the Supreme Court, however, 
stakeholders had begun to understand the implications of the 
issue; multiple representatives of the utility sector submitted 
amici curiae briefs,70 and then, along with environmental groups, 
participated in the process which led to amendments to the CAA 
incorporating non-deterioration provisions.71
Over the next thirty years, these groups frequently interacted 
on this and the entire range of clean air related issues.
 
72  
Environmentalists coalesced at the national level into established 
environmental organizations financed through national 
memberships and foundations, with staff attorneys and scientists 
specializing in the CAA as well as other environmental issues.73
 
 68. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2006).  
  
These groups in turn collaborated by subject area through the 
 69. Sierra Club v. Ruckleshaus, 344 F.Supp 253 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 70. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae, Edison Elec. Inst., Ruckelshaus v. Sierra 
Club, No. 72-804 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 1, 1973), available at 1973 WL 172586; Brief 
Amici Curiae on Behalf of the State of Ariz. and Ten Named Pub. Utils., 
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, No. 72-804 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 27, 1973), available at 
1973 WL 172678.   
 71. See 42 U.S.C. § 7473 (1977). The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments 
allowed deterioration of air quality in “attainment areas” by providing for 
maximum allowable increases of certain air pollutants in those areas. See also 
id. §§ 7470-7474 (1977).  
 72. An example of this would be the negotiations between the Texas utility 
and Environmental Defense Fund leading to a reduction in the number of coal 
plants. See, TXU: A Green Deal as Big as Texas, 38 No. 2 SOLUTIONS 1 Apr. 2007, 
available at http://www.edf.org/documents/5973_0307Solutions.pdf. 
 73. See LAZARUS, supra note 48, at 47; Donna E. Correll, No Peace for the 
Greens: The Criminal Prosecution of Environmental Activists and the Threat of 
Organizational Liability, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 773, 773 n.1 (1993) (citing a chart 
from Green With Fear, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 21, 1990, at 31) (showing an 
increase in membership of several environmental organizations from 1970 to 
1990). 
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evolution of formal coalition partnerships.74
In such situations, negotiation becomes an increasingly 
attractive tool.  Most major issues addressed repeatedly over 
decades through litigation, legislation and rulemaking, become 
settled law.  Entrenched industry stakeholder and environmental 
groups long ago committed each other’s agenda and playbooks to 
memory and in many cases have reached comparable levels of 
sophistication and capability.  In addition to the psychological 
and cultural reasons favoring negotiation among such mature 
parties, the depth of understanding of each other’s positions and 
history of settled prior outcomes means that parties are less 
likely to take unsustainable positions that a court would 
predictably strike down or a familiar agency refuse to support.  
The remaining situations involve fine differences about which no 
one could predict the outcome of submission to a neutral decision-
maker, especially where the parties themselves are far more 
familiar with the subject matter and each other’s needs and 
positions than a court could likely become even after thorough 
briefing.  For such sophisticated parties, deeply familiar with 
each other, the option of litigation is unattractive: “We can’t agree 
so let’s submit it to someone who knows nothing about the matter 
to decide.”  Such parties rarely find such adjudication by 
uninformed neutrals acceptable except when agendas are set for 
political or strategic reasons unrelated to the underlying issues, 
such as, for example, delay.  Thus in many situations, for each 
party the “best alternative to a negotiated solution” or “BATNA,” 
becomes less attractive compared to agreement through 
negotiation, facilitated or direct.
  Similarly, the 
“regulated community” organized itself.  The National 
Association of Manufacturers, the Electric Power Research 
Institute, and the major utilities each developed departments 
with expertise in air pollution issues.  These groups and 
environmental groups interacted constantly, through negotiation, 
adjudication, rulemaking and repeated litigation.  
75
 
 74. See, e.g., The Coalition for Clean Air, http://www.coalitionforcleanair.org/ 
(last visited Dec. 20, 2009).   
  The facilitation itself has 
improved.  Alternative dispute resolution is more widely 
 75. See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING 
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 104 (Bruce Patton ed., Penguin Books 1991) 
(1981). 
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understood and available.76  A class of alternative dispute 
resolution professionals has defined and consolidated its customs 
and rules.77  Federal and many state laws encourage dispute 
resolution.78
Ultimately it is unclear, and will likely remain unclear, as to 
why these stakeholder agreements have proliferated.  They may 
flow from the education of the actors just described, the evolution 
of the underlying subject, or from the intrinsic demands of 
implementation.  These alternative forms may be stimulated in 
part by the increasing rigidity or paralysis of government abetted 
in part by public participation requirements,
 
79 creating a 
conscious effort to flee the perceived burdens of such 
participation, or by a desire to streamline or reform government.  
Whatever the cause, these stakeholder agreements (exciting as 
they may be) have the effect of reducing participation by the 
general public.80
 
 76. The organized environmental movement first resisted, then participated 
in Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). Professor Harter relates for example, 
that the Chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission once 
informed him that using mediation to resolve a complaint would be immoral, but 
that the agency is among the largest users of mediation in the Federal 
government. Interview with Phillip J. Harter, Univ. of Missouri Sch. of Law, in 
Montpelier, Vt. (June 10, 2009) (on file with author) [hereinafter Harter 
Interview]. 
 
 77. See Uniform Mediation Act § 1 (2003). 
 78. See Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-584; 
Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570; Massachusetts 
Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Act, MASS GEN. LAWS. ch. 21D §§ 1-19 (2009) 
(encouraging negotiation). 
 79. See infra Part IV.D. 
 80. See Michael McClosky, Problems With Using Collaboration to Shape 
Environmental Public Policy, 34 VAL. U. L. REV. 423 (2000) (arguing that “over-
reliance on [collaboration] can displace traditional sources of legitimacy”); but 
see Jody Freedman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the 
Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60 (2000) (arguing that stakeholder 
collaboration increases legitimacy because it produces mutually acceptable 
solutions that affected parties devised).  
27
MIHALY  
178 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  27 
1.   The Land Use Example: The Evolution of the 
Subject Creates an Impetus for Negotiated 
Agreements and Contracts, and a Reduction in the 
Role of Lay Public Participation. 
In the land use arena, for example, the confluence of factors 
intrinsic to the field favors contract as a device for applying 
public policy to the use of land.81  Cities still plan and zone, but 
these devices are increasingly procedural, defining the means and 
outer limits for public-private contractual agreements.  Zoning as 
it was originally conceived served to separate uses.  Cities created 
zoning regulation to protect housing from the externalities of 
industrial uses and the traffic and noise associated with 
commercial uses; and then to insure that industrial uses could 
thrive without the complaints of homeowners.82  Such zoning 
efforts also separated the wealthy and the housing ideal (single 
family homes) from housing forms deemed less desirable (such as 
apartments).83
These legislative forms determined the cast of characters and 
the locus of decision-making.  Elected officials made the basic 
decisions as to what uses went where via the legislative act of 
zoning.  The process was relatively open, simple and public.  
Zoning addressed policy questions sufficiently fundamental that 
the value of public input was apparent to both the public and 
decision-makers.  The zone is itself defined with some precision 
conforming uses, and leaves only structural details to discussions 
between builders and building officials; and nothing of 
significance to the general public was left to negotiate.
 
84
 
 81. See Marc B. Mihaly, Living in the Past: the Kelo Court and Public-Private 
Economic Redevelopment, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 40-41 (2007).   
  Any 
 82. See Laurence C. Gerckens, American Zoning and the Physical Isolation of 
Uses, 15 PLAN. COMM’RS J. (1994), available at http://www.plannersweb.com/ 
articles/ger065.html (noting that “[t]he physical separation and isolation of 
dangerous, odoriferous, or unsightly practices, such as tar boiling, soap making, 
fat rendering and dead carcass cremation, was viewed at that time as a 
reasonable governmental response to the unacceptable impositions of one 
otherwise legal activity upon another.”). 
 83. It was in substantial part revulsion to apartments (and probably the 
people who inhabited them) that swayed the Supreme Court majority in Village 
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. to support the zoning concept. See Vill. of Euclid 
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926) (noting “very often the apartment 
house is a mere parasite”).  
 84. Id. at 366 (describing the zoning scheme in the Village of Euclid).   
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other uses that might be desirable somewhere in the zone, but 
whose location could evoke public controversy such as schools, 
stores or group homes in a residential zone, were left to a 
category of “conditional” uses that needed action by a planning 
commission or city council.85
Modern ideas about land use have created processes much 
less receptive to lay participation.  The evolution of land use, 
especially in urban areas since the 1970’s has increasingly 
reflected an opposing ideal to that which animated traditional 
land use regulation: a return to the mix of uses within one area 
seen typically in 19th Century land uses that predated zoning.
  These quasi-adjudicatory hearings 
usually involved simple up or down land use decisions in which 
the unassisted public could easily participate, and still do.  
86  
City planners as well as architects, landscape architects and 
developers contended that separated uses tended to deaden the 
resulting development.87  Separated types of use reduced the 
opportunity to mix populations,88 so residential areas became 
dead during the day and downtowns dead at night.  Residential 
populations had to make automobile trips to commercial districts 
for the simplest errands.89  Mixing residential and commercial 
areas gained popular support as people found they enjoyed living 
in areas activated by office or similar uses during the day, and 
both the residential population and the commercial uses found 
convenience and economic benefit in the presence of the other.90
This process has accelerated as the land use sector has made 
such mixed use the rule rather than the exception, and where 
 
 
 85. See PETER W. SALSICH JR. & TIMOTHY J. TRYNIECKI, LAND USE 
REGULATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS AND PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF LAND USE LAW 
377 (2d ed. 2003). 
 86. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, “No Taking Without a Touching?”  Questions 
from an Armchair Originalist, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 761, 770 (2008) (comparing 
colonial cities like “William Penn’s Philadelphia” to today’s planned unit 
developments).  
 87. See Mihaly, Living in the Past, supra note 81, at 35. 
 88. See Andres Duany & Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, The Neighborhood, the 
District and the Corridor, in THE NEW URBANISM xvii (Peter Katz ed., 1994). 
 89. Id. at xx. 
 90. For a discussion of the reasons for, and benefits of, returning to mixed 
residential and commercial areas, see AM. PLANNING ASSOC., THE PRINCIPLES OF 
SMART DEVELOPMENT 8 (1998) (describing the safety and economic benefits of 
mixed use areas); JOHN A. DUTTON, NEW AMERICAN URBANISM (2000) (describing 
growth and benefits of the New Urbanism movement). 
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acolytes of Jane Jacobs have successfully argued for highly mixed 
uses that defy traditional categories.91  Today, in all regions of 
the country, cities, suburbs, exurbs, and the edge city, members 
of the public live, work and recreate in development forms that 
simply did not exist fifty years ago.  Shopping centers are being 
torn down and replaced (a process transcending “infill” and 
frequently called “refill”) with developments with ground floor 
retail, a mix of ownership and rental residential above, public 
buildings such as city halls and libraries (now serving as 
customer-drawing “anchors” as effective as the prior department 
stores or big box retail), together with open space shared among 
public and private uses.92  Hotels now include residential uses, 
public spaces, and quasi-public commercial uses such as 
restaurants, health clubs, and rental meeting space.  In most 
metropolitan regions, large developments frequently include a 
mix of residential, commercial, office and light industrial uses.93
The confabulation of all these uses in one building or project 
creates challenging complexities on the physical and financial 
front that are increasingly impenetrable to the ordinary citizen.  
Each development type has its own users, structural and space 
design needs, economic performance and resulting financing 
profiles.  The combination requires sophisticated architecture, 
planning and financial structures.  These efforts involve large 
staffs of architects, landscape architects, planners, traffic and 
environmental consultants, and debt and equity players.
 
94
 
 91. JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF THE GREAT AMERICAN CITY (1961). A 
prescient book that advocated dense mixed uses and traditional street grids to 
activate streets and recreate the vibrancy of the older urban centers that the 
City Beautiful and other elements in the 19th and early 20th century land use 
community had hoped to replace with a greener, car-centered utopian vision. 
The New Urbanist movement, following Jacobs’ ideals, has generated intense 
interest in the architectural and planning community. See also DUTTON, supra 
note 90, at 15. 
  Some 
 92. See, e.g., Mihaly, Living in the Past, supra note 81, at 28-32 (discussing 
the successful redevelopment of San Francisco’s ferry building and GAP 
headquarters).  
 93. See Todd W. Bressi, Planning the American Dream, in THE NEW 
AMERICAN URBANISM: TOWARD AND ARCHITECTURE OF COMMUNITY xxv, xxv-xxxv 
(1994) (discussing planned development in Boston’s Back Bay and Seattle’s 
Capital Hill and the basic design features of the New Urbanist Movement); see, 
e.g., DAVID WANN, DEEP DESIGN: PATHWAYS TO A LIVABLE FUTURE 132 (1996) 
(examining redevelopment on the replaced Denver Stapleton Airport). 
 94. See generally Mihaly, Living in the Past, supra note 81, at 28-41. 
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especially capable jurisdictions mirror that expert work with 
review by internal staff.95  In most of the smaller cities, towns 
and counties, the public entity must rely entirely on the work of 
the development team.  Even staff capable of substantive project 
review cannot typically revise the project to meet regulatory or 
policy concerns, but must return it to the development team for 
modification.96
Thus, whether the public process occurs in the quasi-
adjudicatory setting of permit review or the legislative setting of 
master or general plan review and rezoning, the matter reaches 
the public only when the pie is baked.  The salient details and 
true drivers of the project frequently are invisible to the public.  
These intertwined uses often require joint ventures among 
developers of different uses, and resulting debt and equity 
structures that operate to determine many of the project’s design 
elements and phasing.  Yet, few project proposals reveal such 
detail, and if they did, few members of the public would 
understand what they saw.  The public cannot participate in the 
internal negotiations which lead to the precursor documents 
which operate to define the project, such as the formation of the 
partnership or joint venture, agreements among equity 
participants, the request for proposals sent by development teams 
to different lenders, the agreements among lenders, the resulting 
loan documents, nor the developer’s economic, planning, traffic 
and environmental studies leading to the proposed land uses and 
intensities in the development application.
 
97
These projects do of course surface for public review in the 
form of plan amendments, re-zoning or land use permits.  The 
public presentation of the result provides an opportunity for 
public involvement, but one that is fraught with practical 
difficulties so as to render the public forum a failure as a place 
  Nor does the public 
participate in negotiations between the development team and 
city staff. 
 
 95.  Id. The San Francisco Port Authority and Redevelopment Agency was 
given the task of planning the new redevelopment of the ferry terminal, thus 
internal staff was carrying this out this function.  
 96. Id. 
 97. In projects with substantial federal involvement or in states with “little 
NEPA’s,” an EIS or other public document will detail environmental impacts, 
but strategic use of that information to modify projects in a material way 
requires representation and experts. See discussion infra Part IV. 
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where serious issues might be joined.  The citizens who wish to 
have effect face two obstacles: they are too late and the issues are 
two complex.  To be sure, it is easy enough to oppose some of the 
uses or densities on aesthetic, traffic or other environmental 
grounds, but this “first” public forum occurs after months or years 
of negotiation over project formulation.  At this late stage, such 
testimony usually presents decision-makers with an unappetizing 
all-or-nothing option rather than presenting a road map for a less 
damaging alternative.  It is well within the capability of the 
general public to oppose the development altogether, but outside 
of cases involving major environmental constraints, the decision-
makers, legislators at this final decision point believing that the 
process to date has resolved the complex socioeconomic tradeoffs, 
usually will treat such total opposition as an unsophisticated and 
untenable response.  The interdependency of uses and the 
realities underlying the effort make it difficult to respond to such 
positions without re-conceptualizing the proposal, an effort so 
great that it generally does not occur absent citizen expertise or a 
well-financed opposition effort using retained experts, agents 
familiar with the issues, and commencing much earlier than the 
formal process. 
Frequently, the true details of the permitted development 
and public concessions to the developer find their home not in 
relatively accessible plans and zoning statutes, but in a   
development contract between the project proponent and the 
permitting jurisdiction which may guarantee development rights 
over a period of time,98 and define project elements, project 
phasing, and public financing.  Such development agreements 
constitute a form of contract that has substantial advantages over 
regulation for both cities and developers.99
 
 98. See, e.g., Mihaly, Living in the Past, supra note 81, at 40-41. See also 
MARY BETH CORRIGAN ET AL., TEN PRINCIPLES FOR SUCCESSFUL PUBLIC/PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS 10 (2005).  
  Confronted with a 
concerted anti-tax movement and successful campaigns to 
otherwise limit government income, cities want development to 
finance and provide infrastructure that the government 
 99. Many states and local jurisdictions have enabling legislation providing 
for the use of such development agreements and defining their general contents. 
See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65864-69.5 (West 2009). 
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traditionally provided.100  City officials need a vehicle that allows 
them to define project elements with precision so they can 
condition rights to develop on developer contributions to public 
goals related to the project.  Developers, in turn, also prefer such 
contracts because the long-term right to their development 
proposal renders it easier for them to raise and commit capital for 
large projects with substantial infrastructure.101  Such contracts 
form part of the project documentation available to the public, but 
are so long and complex as to be inaccessible to anyone who has 
not been a party to their negotiation.102
This combination of increasing sophistication regarding the 
built environment along with reduced public participation 
becomes especially acute where the public weal itself is a 
protagonist in the land use effort.  In the modern land use arena, 
many of the major land use changes in central cities result from 
public-private development efforts.  Large scale new towns, the 
redevelopment of military bases, old airports, and large, decayed 
industrial areas present land use opportunities for cities as well 
as developers.  Sometimes the permitting jurisdiction may own 
the land involved; in others the parcels are owned or controlled by 
a private party, but in either case the public ceases to be a 
passive regulator, and instead has its own goals it desires to 
accomplish through the development.  Such motivating policies 
could include production of affordable housing, job creation, 
revitalization of deteriorated areas where the free market has 
failed to produce development, rehabilitation and use of historic 
 
 
 100. MIKE E. MILES, ET AL., REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT: PRINCIPLES AND 
PROCESS (4th ed. 2007); CORRIGAN, supra note 98, at 10-11.   
 101. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65864(a) (West 2009) (recognizing that lack of 
certainty in development approval stymies private investment).  
 102. Contracts frequently contemplate 20 year or longer effective terms, 
periods sometimes expressly keyed to the duration of project debt instruments.  
The documents themselves, frequently multi-volume, are drafted to guide the 
parties during project implementation and in the event of later disputes.  They 
contain detailed recitals of obligations and the conditions thereto. While they 
may contain financial provisions relating to division of revenue from the project 
and the financial obligations of the parties, they rarely contain evidence of the 
economic models upon which the negotiations were based. They are utterly 
impenetrable to someone who does not have some other guide to the nature of 
the deal. See, e.g., Mihaly, Living in the Past, supra note 81, at 40-41.  
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buildings or districts, creation of parks or recreational facilities, 
or preservation of sensitive environmental habitats.103
Cities, sometimes through their redevelopment agencies 
 
104 
or other public development entities, become partners in the 
development effort.  Often they start by owning the land (as in a 
military base 105 or a now replaced in-city airport site 106
Admirable efforts to enhance the efficiency of these public-
private efforts have rendered them extremely complex.  As the 
public and the private entities each identify what they do best, 
they tend to assign roles accordingly, and the casualty is the 
boundary between traditional public and private regimes.  Streets 
may be designed by a city, built by a developer, and partly owned 
by each.  Parks may be city designed, publicly financed, publicly 
regulated, but privately constructed and owned.  Public land may 
be sold, then leased back, and even released again.  These 
relationships usually cannot be contained in traditional 
), or they 
use their capabilities to assemble small, undevelopable parcels, 
often the artifacts of land uses of prior eras, into land which can 
be re-subdivided and sold for modern land use.  They may select 
private developers to undertake project planning or even the 
actual “vertical” development.  Alternatively, if the land is 
privately owned, cities may play a key financing role, through 
property tax-based financing or grants.  These arrangements 
operate such that cities become de facto or de jure partners in the 
effort.  
 
 103. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, 
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 722 (2006). 
 104. See, e.g., Saint Paul Minnesota, Housing and Redevelopment Authority 
(HRA), http://www.stpaul.gov/index.asp?nid=1268 (last visited Dec. 20, 2009). 
 105. See generally Base Realignment and Closures Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2687 
(2006). For a more complete discussion on how the Base Realignment and 
Closures Act helps further local redevelopment on old military bases, see James 
A. Kushner, Planning for Downsizing: A Comparison of the Economic 
Revitalization Initiatives in American Communities Facing Military Base 
Closure with the German Experience of Relocating the National Capital from 
Bonn to Berlin, 33 URB. LAW. 119, 126 (2001) (discussing the shift from federal 
to local authority and stakeholders for redevelopment planning); Harrry M. 
Parent, Commentary, BRAC to the Future; Managing Past Encroachment, 
Present Growth, and Future Land Use around Military Instillations, 60 PLAN. & 
ENVTL. L. 3 (2008) (discussing local planning in association with population 
changes in communities due to recent military base closure). 
 106. See, e.g., WANN, supra note 93, at 132 (examining redevelopment on the 
replaced Denver Stapleton Airport). 
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regulatory documents, and are instead embodied in a complex 
contract between a government and a team of developers.  Such 
development agreements, purchase and sale agreements, 
disposition and development agreements and owner participation 
agreements (for redevelopment), or other contracts can take large 
teams several years or more to negotiate, with the result 
contained in multi-volume documents.107
These contracts are rarely negotiated in public.  The 
resulting final draft agreements are presented post hoc to the 
public as part of the project approval documentation, but the 
public itself has no role during the long and arduous negotiation 
process.  City managers do strive to summarize key issues on an 
ongoing basis, but those summaries are presented to councils as 
privileged documents and discussed in executive session.  The 
public sees and can comment on the document only when the 
negotiation is complete and a draft contract emerges.  Some cities 
have specific ordinances specifying this arrangement.
 
108  Many 
others rely on state legislation provisions that except negotiations 
for certain land purchases from notice and open meeting 
requirements.  Reliance on such exemptions may be equally 
problematic since many such contracts either contain no sale and 
purchase, or such a transaction forms a small part of the overall 
panel of negotiated issues.109
Even after the contracts emerge for public review, it is 
extremely rare that anyone can penetrate the documents 
sufficiently to propose meaningful change.  The contracts are 
simply too long and too complex; the text is designed to produce 
ultimate clarity in the event of a subsequent dispute on a specific 
  Many jurisdictions simply negotiate 
in private without any specific authority.  In any case, the public 
plays no part.  If a jurisdiction does allow public attendance and 
involvement, the negotiation tends to be a sham, and the true 
negotiation occurs in other ways.  
 
 107. Even geographically limited infill development often involves substantial 
documentation. The transit oriented development at a station on the San 
Francisco Bay Area light rail system is six volumes long and includes many 
ancillary documents and over 100 exhibits. Telephone Interview with Leslie 
Browne (July 13, 2009) (on file with author).  
 108. See, e.g., CITY OF PASADENA, CAL. ZONING CODE art. 6, ch. 17.66.040(g) 
(2005), available at http://www.ci.pasadena.ca.us/zoning/P-6.html#17.66.  
 109. See, e.g., Open Meetings Act—Exceptions, 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/2(c)(5-6) 
(2008).   
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issue, not to tell the “story” of the underlying deal in a manner 
accessible to third parties.  Councils themselves rarely under-
stand the elements of the contract, and rely instead on a report by 
the city manager or similar official who in fact cannot fully 
comprehend the document either, and in turn relies on the 
conclusions of the jurisdiction’s negotiating team.  As any 
transactional attorney knows, it is next to impossible to penetrate 
a complex transactional document by reading its contents from 
one end to the other.  Even an expert reviewer familiar with the 
transaction type could master such documents only through 
arduous work, and it is uneconomical to address a long document 
in that manner.  Instead, such reviewers talk to the negotiators to 
get context and direction.110
It belabors the obvious to say that this process remains as a 
practical matter opaque to the general public.  Lay participants 
cannot mount a serious inquiry into the merits of these 
arrangements absent sophisticated legal and economic advice, 
and even then the assistance would require accessibility to 
information and processes that are de facto not open to the 
general public or its representatives.  In short, as land use 
becomes what many consider “better,” that is more interrelated, 
more designed in recognition of the interdependency of the 
activities people undertake in their lives, the general public has 
less and less to say about the result.  This is one of the decision 
types most resistant to citizen participation.  Partnership with 
attorneys and experts, discussed later in more depth, will help, 
but only if the effort is commenced very early in the project 
planning process and sustained throughout the planning and 
regulatory process. 
 
2.   Other Environmental Areas Face Similar Trends 
Toward Solutions Negotiated by Stakeholders in 
Private without Meaningful Roles for the Lay 
Public. 
This tendency towards complexity, negotiation and contract 
in lieu of legislation, and the concomitant reduction in 
meaningful involvement of the lay public, extends beyond land 
 
 110. I negotiated such documents throughout the 1990’s. These issues are 
discussed in detail in, Mihaly, Living in the Past, supra note 81.  
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use to other areas of environmental effort.  Stakeholder 
dominated processes, whether created de jure or otherwise, seem 
to be on the rise.  Some are created pursuant to federal, state or 
local statute.  Some arise from informal processes among 
potential claimants to a common resource.  In either case, for the 
potential lay participant, the barriers to entry are almost always 
higher; the processes are less transparent and accessible than in 
traditional governmental decision-making. 
These difficulties persist even where the process is sponsored 
by a governmental entity.  For example, consider recent efforts to 
address growing competition for scarce water resources in the 
Western United States, a discussion driven by the competing 
needs of agriculture, growing population centers, and “in-stream” 
use of water to protect fish and their habitat, as well as current 
drought and apprehension over the near future effect of global 
warming on snow pack accumulation and temperature.111
For more than a century, water rights in the Western United 
States have been memorialized in complex water adjudications or 
water contracts between federal or state water projects and 
consumers.
 
112  Public involvement in these depended on the 
forum.  The judiciary is transparent to the public, but operates 
without public participation, except those who achieve party or 
amicus curiae status.  Water adjudications were open to the 
public and the press, but driven solely by the claimants and their 
attorneys.  The water contracts were negotiated in private, but 
they were for the most part bi-party and fairly easy to 
comprehend, even if sometimes intricate in detail.  Once 
negotiated, they were adopted by agencies through processes 
that, for the most part, were open to public comment or 
testimony.113
 
 111. See Mark Lubell et al., Watershed Partnerships and the Emergence of 
Collective Action Institutions, 46 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 148 (2002), available at 
http://www.des.ucdavis.edu/faculty/ lubell/Research/WatershedFinalText.pdf.  
 
112. For a comprehensive history of water rights in the American West, see 
JOSEPH SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 280-316 (West, 3d ed. 
2000) (origin year); ROBERT G. DUNBAR, FORGING NEW RIGHTS IN WESTERN 
WATERS (1983). 
 113. Bryan J. Wilson, Westlands Water District and its Federal Water: A Case 
Study of Water District Politics, 7 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 187 (1987/1988) (describing 
the process by which a California District obtained contracts to purchase water). 
See also CAL. WATER  CODE §§ 120-142 (West 2009). 
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That scenario has evolved as parties struggled with 
increasing demand for a scarce resource and new claimants came 
to the table.  The application of public rulemaking to such 
processes became interminable.  Water adjudication consumes 
decades.  Parties have used litigation with such success that the 
stakeholders have mutually paralyzed each other, so no 
movement occurs as long as traditional fora are employed.  In 
order to escape these encrusted public processes, the stakeholders 
increasingly turn to large-scale negotiations, usually 
memorialized by contract or that neutral and ambiguous term, 
“memoranda of understanding” (MOU).114
The recent resolution of conflict among stakeholders 
concerning the water in the American River in northern 
California provides an example of such a negotiation and 
agreement.
 Some of these 
agreements are public while others remain purely private.  
115  The water in the American River, which flows 
from the Sierra Nevada into the Sacramento River at the City of 
Sacramento, has long been the subject of controversy prototypical 
of recent water disputes.  Farmers use the water to irrigate their 
fertile fields.  Without the water, they could not grow the 
agricultural produce now dominant in the Central Valley.  At the 
same time, the City of Sacramento and other urban centers 
sharing the water experienced rapid growth. Increasing 
comprehension of the environmental needs of anadromous fish in 
the river caused regulators to divert water for in-stream purposes 
in support of the fish and their habitat.  Appropriations have 
been marked by conflict among users and between those users 
and organized environmental groups.116
Legislation (and adjudication) typically provided the forum 
where such competing social and economic needs were resolved.  
In this case, however, the stakeholders elected to abandon the 
public arena and resolve competing needs to American River 
water through negotiation.  It is unclear how much the parties 
 
 
 114. See, e.g., The Sacramento Area Water Forum, Memorandum of 
Understanding for the Water Forum Agreement (2000), http://www.waterforum. 
org/PDF/SEC_1.PDF [hereinafter Memorandum of Understanding]. 
 115. See Water Forum, The Agreements, Water Forum Agreement, 
http://www.waterforum.org/agreement.cfm (last visited Dec. 20, 2009).  
 116. Telephone Interview with Tom Gohring, Executive Dir. of the Water 
Forum, (June 30, 2009) (on file with author). 
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were motivated by fatigue with their battles in the public forum 
and how much they were attracted to the increasing use of 
sophisticated multi-party dispute resolution.  Whatever the 
motivation, discussions among the stakeholders in this large and 
long-standing dispute began informally under the auspices of the 
City of Sacramento.  The parties to the negotiation then 
formalized the effort as the Sacramento Area Water Forum, a 
completely voluntary negotiation among stakeholders who 
essentially convened themselves.117  The effort slowly accreted 
funding, and a technical and legal staff was formed, lent by 
stakeholders in the discussions.  The stakeholders convened 
negotiations on a more or less monthly basis, and subcommittees 
formed and met as well.  The process continued for three years, 
and produced a draft MOU that allocated the American River 
water among all users.118
It is most significant that, although any individual or 
organization could determine to commit the resources and attend 
as a stakeholder, in no normal sense was the public a participant 
or even an observer.  Individuals did not attend.  Although no 
means existed to enforce privacy, the culture of the proceedings 
discouraged public participation.  Meetings were not noticed, and 
they were frequently held at times and in locations not amenable 
to public participation.  Public testimony was not affirmatively 
promoted by the participants, no specific provision for it was 
made, and with very limited exception, none in fact occurred.
 
119
Once a draft MOU emerged, a public process began.  Since 
the stakeholders included public entities and the federal 
government was an observer, MOU participants agreed to 
perform a joint environmental impact statement (EIS)/ environ-
mental impact report (EIR) under NEPA and California 
 
 
 117. See Sarah Connick, The Sacremento Area Water Forum: A Case Study, 
(Univ. of Cal. Berkeley, Inst. of Urban and Reg’l Dev., Working Paper No. 2006-
06, 2006), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 
1051&context=iurd; see also Water Forum, About the Water Forum, 
http://www.waterforum.org/about.cfm (last visited Dec. 20, 2009).  
 118. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 114. 
 119. Interview with Christy H. Taylor, former partner, Shute, Mihaly & 
Weinberger, in Montpelier, Vt. (Oct. 11, 2008) (on file with author) (Ms. Taylor 
represented the Water Forum, in California) [hereinafter Taylor Interview]. 
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Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).120  The extensive comments 
received originated almost entirely from the stakeholders and 
other organizational entities.  The proposed final MOU adopted 
by the participants reflected responses to these commenters.  
Almost none of the comments, and none of the changes, 
originated from the general public.121
C. The Dynamics of Evolved Environmental Decision-
making Frequently Favor Resolution by Small 
Groups Operating in Private. 
 
Everyone who has negotiated a difficult contract or made a 
decision on a complex matter knows that conflict in these 
situations presents itself in layered, intricate ways, some not 
initially apparent.  As negotiation peals back initial concerns, 
new issues emerge.  These negotiations require solutions that 
weave a fabric of compromise on multiple points, usually taking 
enough effort to tax the patience and time of those involved.  In 
such negotiations, parties develop assurance that they 
understand other parties’ agenda, and may engage in problem 
solving at a level which harnesses the perspectives of each party 
in finding ways to meet the needs of the others.  Sometimes the 
parties reach agreement only because an atmosphere of mutual 
trust evolves over time, allowing intuitive leaps and a focus on 
ultimate goals rather than initially perceived means.122
These processes favorable to solutions of complex problems 
cannot occur in a public setting.  The slow pace and small group 
 
 
 120. See Water Forum, Environmental Impact Report (EIR), Draft E.I.R., 
http://www.waterforum.org/EIRdocs.cfm (last visited Dec. 20, 2009) (scroll down 
to view Draft E.I.R.); Id. (scroll down to view Final E.I.R.). See also Water 
Forum, Final Environmental Impact Report on the Water Forum Proposal, 
http://www.waterforum.org/EIRdocs.cfm (last visited Sept. 8, 2009).  
 121. Taylor Interview, supra note 119. 
 122. See Jeffrey G. Miller & Thomas R. Colosi, Understanding Negotiation and 
Effective Communication, in ENVTL. LAW INST., FUNDAMENTALS OF NEGOTIATION: 
A GUIDE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROFESSIONALS 5 (1989) (discussing the ability of 
small group negotiations to foster trust); Philip Harter, Experienced Practitioner 
Offers Guidance to Participants in Negotiated Rule Making, 1991 FED. AGENCIES 
& ADR 173 (noting that “[s]everal participants [in stakeholder collaborative 
decision making] have said that the working relationships that were established 
during the negotiations gave them an understanding of the other side . . . 
Moreover, the  negotiations usually significantly narrow the issues in 
controversy so the parties can focus on those that really separate them.”). 
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size required makes public participation problematic.  One can 
design small, highly structured negotiations where a larger group 
observes, as in large diplomatic negotiations, but in those 
situations, even the observers are usually stakeholder staff, and 
even then, the more delicate discussions move to completely 
private settings.123
For example, I represented a homeowners association 
opposing a large development.  Their homes lay at the end of a 
pastoral valley.  Residents and visitors accessed their neighbor-
hood by leaving the interstate, driving along a long and bucolic 
two-lane road through agricultural land, at last arriving at their 
residential community.  The development proposed to replace the 
agricultural land with many hundreds of homes.  The public 
process, approval of a general plan amendment and planned 
development permits, yielded no compromise; the approvals were 
forthcoming, and the community group commenced what would 
likely be prolonged litigation.  Negotiations ensued and continued 
for months.  The community representatives, the city and the 
developer’s representatives formed a small working group, met 
frequently, came to understand each other’s agendas, and 
developed a certain amount of trust.  
  Any environmental practitioner involved in 
complex discussions will recognize this dynamic. 
The discussion required the community group to determine 
the true core of its position, redefining and refining what the 
existing homeowners really needed.  They came to understand 
that it was, of course, not the development itself they opposed, 
but certain of the development’s effects, in this case traffic, the 
destruction of their two-lane country road, and the loss of their 
open space “view-shed” in the lower valley.  In response, the 
developer fashioned the solution in a complex series of landscaped 
setbacks, a landscaped boulevard, a limit on the length of the 
widened roadway, and a contractual guarantee that the road 
would not be widened in the future.  The group retained a 
financial expert who evaluated the project.  The expert 
determined that some of the proposed solutions were too 
expensive and others were in fact financially feasible. 
This process required a small group and confidential 
discussions.  For representatives of the community group, private 
 
 123. See Harter, Negotiating Regulations, supra note 61, at 84-85.  
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negotiations were necessary to force the painful and prolonged 
process of abandoning perceived grounds of opposition and 
substituting more narrow grounds that were amenable to 
solution.  The three community members of the negotiating group 
became expert in the relevant planning and development issues, 
and developed positions which took time to sell to those members 
who were less involved.  For long periods in the negotiation the 
attendees articulated ideas which would have dismayed others in 
their respective groups.  The dynamics of such situations involve 
the eventual resolution of tensions between members of the 
community group who attend the negotiations, develop 
familiarity with the issues, and trust for the opposing party, and 
the slow education those members who have not been privy to the 
discussions.124
For the developer in this case, the confidentiality of the 
setting and eventual familiarity with opposing parties, proved 
essential as well.  Raising the options just mentioned posed 
substantial risks.  What if the developer had proposed expensive 
landscape buffers, housing areas pulled back from the road, and 
future limits on development implied in the two-lane guarantee, 
only to find these proposals formed the floor of any public 
consideration of the development proposal, with no guarantee of 
settlement in return?  Exploration of such options can only occur 
in private settings. 
 This deliberative process would have been 
impossible in a larger group or an open forum.   
It may now fly in the face of accepted convention to suggest 
that a closed forum provides a superior setting for land use and 
environmental decision-making, but surely this flows from the 
situational practicalities, the nature of human beings, and is not 
new in the American experience. The United States 
Constitutional Convention was a closed negotiation.  The public 
had ample opportunity to comment from pre-convention through 
ratification.  The pre-convention public debate, usually in the 
form of publications, such as the Federalist Papers and responses 
 
 124. See CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES 
FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT 166-210 (1996) (discussing the trust and cooperation 
that is built during the process); David. A. Straus, Managing Meetings to Build 
Consensus, in CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK 287 (Lawrence Susskind, Sarah 
McKearnan & Jennifer Thomas-Larmer eds., 1999) (discussing how to build 
trust in negotiation meetings). 
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thereto, as well as the ratification debates made the Constitution 
one of the most public documents of its century.  However, when 
it came to structuring the negotiation of the draft itself, the 
conveners chose a private session without public testimony or 
other citizen participation, and most observers believe the 
document would otherwise not have emerged.125  Madison, 
Washington and the other designers of the session likely knew all 
too well the breath of issues to be addressed, and the need to 
reach agreement on all of them.  They agreed that no one issue 
was deemed decided until all were determined and thus 
understood the correlative need for efficiency.126
These situational and subject-matter exigencies thus lead to 
small, closed fora as an option the participants view as superior 
to a more traditional public processes that at least nominally 
encouraged participation.  The outcome may be superior, and for 
the lay participants involved, formative of civic virtue, but the 
process is private, and intrinsically closed to outside lay 
participants who are not stakeholders.  Thus, only those citizen’s 
involved in the negotiation participate in the decision, and they 
will likely need representation and expertise during the process, 
or their efforts will be as ineffectual as in other processes.  
  Finally, each of 
them had experienced the intensity of opinion surrounding the 
questions to be debated and knew that positions raised in open 
session would produce quick reactions and counter reactions that 
would in turn circle back on the delegates pressuring them to 
modify position before compromise could be fully explored.  
III. THE CASE OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY ACT AND ITS STATE PROGENY: THE 
 
 125. See, e.g., CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA: THE 
STORY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION  (1986) (noting that the document 
and its key intrinsic compromises emerged during the convention itself, and that 
extended negotiation occurred with no opportunity for testimony or comment of 
the many drafts considered during that famous summer of 1787). See also 
CHRISTOPHER COLLIER & JAMES COLLIER, THE DECISION IN PHILADELPHIA: THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787 83-84 (1987).  
 126. This is a fundamental tenet of negotiation and collaboration. See Harter, 
Experienced Practitioner Offers Guidance to Participants in Negotiated Rule 
Making, supra note 122, at 183 (observing that “[t]he quest of the enterprise . . . 
is to reach agreement on an entire package . . . Thus, no decisions are final until 
the end and everything remains tentative, subject to change.”). 
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RISE OF EXPERTISE AND ITS USE AS A 
PARTNERSHIP WITH CITIZEN PARTICIPATION. 
Nothing illustrates the contrasts between the participatory 
ideal and the realities of the participatory process better than the 
decision-making process of NEPA 127 and the state equivalents, 
the  “little NEPA’s”, of which the CEQA 128 is one of the most 
articulated.129
A.  The Creation, at Least De Jure, of New 
Participatory Rights and Roles. 
  NEPA and CEQA also provide the context for 
discussion of the necessary combination of citizens and experts 
needed to navigate this contrast between ideal and real in ways 
that lead to effective public participation. 
For environmental advocates, commentators, and in fact, for 
the courts, these statutes embody the participatory ideal.130  Both 
NEPA and CEQA require that government decision-makers 
create and then use thorough reports to evaluate the 
environmental impact of projects or actions prior to approval.131
 
 127. National Environmental Policy Review Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-
4375 (2006).  
  
Both popular and scholarly literature recognize NEPA and its 
progeny as revolutionary in many respects:  the concept elevated 
the environment to the forefront of many governmental processes, 
 128. California Environmental Quality Review Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE 
§21000 (West 2009).  
 129. As of 1995, sixteen states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have 
NEPA-like statutes. This article discusses the federal NEPA statute and utilizes 
the California statute CEQA as an example of a NEPA-like statute at the state 
level. See generally Joshua Yost, NEPA’s Progeny: State Environmental Policy 
Acts, 3 ENVTL L. REP. 50090 (1973); Philip Weinberg, A Powerful Mandate: 
NEPA and State Environmental Review Acts in the Courts, 5 PACE ENVTL. L. 
REV. 1 (1987).  
130. Philip Michael Ferester, Revitalizing the National Environmental Policy 
Act: Substantive Law Adaptations From NEPA’s Progeny, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 207 (1992) (citing Peter Borrelli, Environmental Ethics—The Oxymoron of 
Our Time, AMICUS J., Summer 1989, at 39, 41 (book review) (describing NEPA 
as the environmental “Ten Commandments” and “the environmental bill of 
rights...”)); see also EVA H. HANKS & JOHN L. HANKS, An Environmental Bill of 
Rights: The Citizen Suit and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 
RUTGERS L. REV. 230 (1970). 
 131. 42 U.S.C § 4322(c) (2006); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080 (West 2009).  
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and the applicable statutes mandate integrated reviews that cut 
across disciplines and bureaucratic boundaries.132
1.  The Transfer of Information to Lay Participants. 
 
The applicable statutes, regulations, guidelines and 
abundant case law set forth in detail the structure and content of 
these environmental reports, the EIS in the case of NEPA and the 
EIR under CEQA.  These environmental documents must address 
all potentially significant environmental impacts of the 
proposal133 and a reasonable range of feasible alternatives, 
including the alternative of no project at all.134  Impacts analyzed 
include those where the impact of the subject project may be 
small, but together with similar projects, may be cumulatively 
significant.135  The analyses must include measures that could 
mitigate environmental impact, whether the agency charged with 
the report has the power to implement them or not.136  For 
substantial projects, multi-volume reports may run to thousands 
of pages.137  This sort of integrated, public environ-mental 
analyses had never occurred prior to NEPA, a much-discussed sea 
change in the history of the environmental movement, and a 
concept emulated in other countries.138
To be sure, prior to NEPA, the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA) and other federal and state statutes contained processes by 
 
 
 132. See, e.g., Harvey Black, Imperfect Protection: NEPA at 35, 112 ENVTL. 
HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 292 (2004) (describing NEPA’s revolutionary beginnings 
and evolution).  
 133. See Hanley v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972).   
 134. See Nat’l. Res. Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 
1972).  
 135. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2009) (defining “cumulative impact”); see also U.S. 
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF FED. ACTIVITIES, CONSIDERATION OF 
CUMULATIVE IMPACTS IN EPA REVIEW OF NEPA DOCUMENTS (1999), http://www. 
epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/nepa/cumulative.pdf.  
 136. See Morton, 458 F.2d at 834. 
 137. See, e.g., Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), Environmental 
Impact Statements (EISs), http://www.ferc.gov/industries/lng/enviro/eis/2008/01-
11-08-eis.asp (last visited Dec. 20, 2009) (a recent final Environmental Impact 
Statement for a liquefied natural gas terminal exceeding 2000 pages).  
 138. See Black, supra note 132, at A293 (noting that “more than 100 other 
countries have adopted NEPA-like statutes”); MICHAEL MASON, ENVIRONMENTAL 
DEMOCRACY 79-83 (1999) (discussing integrated approach of the Canadian 
Environmental Protection Act (CEPA) and the Netherlands Environmental 
Policy Plan (NEPP)). 
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which government published proposals and took public 
comments, and had some basic responsibility to acknowledge and 
respond (and still do),139 but the NEPA process represented both 
a quantitative and qualitative departure from these rulemaking 
and similar endeavors.  NEPA and its progeny opened up an 
entire range of governmental decisions that had never been 
subject to public participation, requiring that environmental 
reports accompany a broad array of decision-making types, not 
just rulemaking and administrative adjudication.140  Also, more 
than rulemaking, the environmental report represents a 
substantial transfer of information from government to the 
general public.141  Rulemaking begins with the publication of a 
proposed rule,142 and while usually (but not necessarily) 
accompanied by an agency narrative explanation or annotation,143 
the effort contains nothing like the level of detail in the EIS.  The 
EIS or EIR essentially turns over to the public the relevant body 
of environmental expert thought on the project.  This includes 
extensive recitation of the basic scientific information, 
explanation of methodologies, source references, and appended 
source documents.144  If a project would cause impacts on air 
quality, for example, the report must model the impacts, detail 
the results with appropriate diagrams, charts, isopleths or tables 
of pollutant concentration, and, most significantly, introduce the 
reader to the modeling, and frequently, append data in detail 
(though rarely—and importantly—the model itself).145
 
 139. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(i) (2006). 
 
 140. NEPA requires to Federal agencies to compile an environmental report 
for any “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006). Pursuant to a foundational opinion of 
the California Supreme Court, CEQA applies to governmental approvals of 
private projects. See Friends of Mammoth v. Bd. of Supervisors of Mono County, 
502 P.2d 1049 (Cal. 1972).   
 141. See Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 
449 F.2d 1109, 1119 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Justice Skelly Wright’s early judicial 
treatise on the contours of NEPA highlights the important purposes of the EIS, 
including transfer of information to the general public).  
 142. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2006). 
 143. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006). 
 144. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.3-1502.18 (2009). 
 145. 42 U.S.C. §4332 (2006); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §21157(b) (West 2009); see 
also Envtl. Defense Fund v. Hardin, 325 F.Supp. 1401, 1403-04 (D.C. Cir. 1971).  
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2. The Financial Subsidy of Citizen Participants. 
As any project proponent will readily attest, these documents 
constitute a significant project expense, and for large projects, the 
effort runs well into the seven figures.146  While much of that may 
go to the writing and production of the document, the majority of 
the expense represents the effort of numerous experts, either on 
agency staff or consultants retained to evaluate the project.  EIS 
or EIR preparation teams typically may include experts who 
specialize in air quality, water quality, transportation analysis, 
specific flora and fauna impacts, archeological resources, design, 
and wind and shadow analyses, and other disciplines as 
required.147  These consultants charge professional rates, but the 
charge is born by the sponsoring governmental or private entity, 
not the readers.148
 
 146. See, e.g., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON THE STATEWIDE LARGE-
CAPACITY FERRY ENVTL. IMPACT STATEMENT 4 (2008) (questioning “[h]ow much 
does the EIS cost . . . ? The contract for the preparation of the EIS is $1.3 
million”); U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, PEIS for Oyster Restoration in 
Chesapeake Bay Including the use of Native and/or Nonnative Oyster, 
http://www.nao.usace.army. mil/OysterEIS/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2009) (noting 
that “[t]he preparation of the environmental impact statement . . . [will have] an 
estimated cost of $4,000,000.”).  
  Thus, NEPA and little NEPAs worked a true 
revolution in participation.  For the first time, government (and 
in the case of CEQA, the private sector through government) was 
required to transfer the fruits of their expertise to the public at no 
cost.  The impact of this subsidy cannot be overstated since the 
cost of acquiring the information would be prohibitive to most lay 
participants. 
 147. Robert Eli Rosen, Complicating Law’s Legitimation Processes, 25 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 973, 978 (2000) (explaining how the Bureau of Reclamation hired 
planners, biologists, and social scientists to better handle NEPA procedures); 
Eric Biber, Too Many Things to do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of 
Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 37 (2009) (finding that “the 
requirement that agencies conduct NEPA analyses may force the agency to hire 
staff who are expert at producing those analyses. Those staff are likely to be 
professionally trained in fields such as biology, toxicology, public health, 
pollution control, and other areas.”). 
 148. Steven Ferrey, Gate Keeping Global Warming: The International Role of 
Environmental Assessments and Regulation in Controlling Choices for Future 
Power Development, 19 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 101, 139 (2009) (noting that 
“[t]he federal government pays the EIS preparation costs for all government-
sponsored projects, and for most other projects the agency shifts responsibility 
and financial obligations for the Environmental Assessment to the private 
project sponsor.”). 
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3.  The Role of Commentor. 
NEPA also created a public role that went beyond receipt of 
information; it created a new participatory role for the public, 
that of commentor.  While the APA evolved to include an 
analogous comment and response component,149 NEPA and its 
progeny have created new formalized commentor rights.  NEPA 
and little NEPAs require agencies to prepare these documents in 
draft form.150  The public then has time, though usually not 
enough time, to respond to the EIS or EIR in the form of written 
or oral (and then transcribed) comment, and then, in yet another 
revolutionary requirement, both the federal and state versions 
mandate a detailed response to the comments.151  If someone 
suggests a new impact, the documents must confront their point.  
Under CEQA, if a commentor proposes a different alternative or 
mitigation measure, the final report must either take on the 
analysis of the proposal or explain why it is statutorily 
unnecessary.152
If in the modern world, information is power, then NEPA has 
empowered the general public, creating the potential for new and 
sophisticated forms of public participation.  Most citizens, 
organized or not, lack the means to create the information in an 
EIS.  They rarely have access to the elements of the project 
definition necessary to carry out sophisticated analysis of its 
impact or develop alternatives.  NEPA requires that the EIS 
describe the program or project in detail.
 
153
 
 149. 5 U.S.C.§§ 553(b)-553(c) (2006). 
  Citizens could in 
concept retain a cadre of experts to analyze the environmental 
impacts of a program or project, but it is unlikely that alone, or in 
ad hoc or small groups, they could pay the cost of generating the 
information.  NEPA and its progeny give them the information 
without cost.  Even if citizens submitted the analysis in the form 
of testimony, most processes would allow a reluctant agency to 
receive the information and ignore its content.  NEPA forces a 
response (although as discussed infra not necessarily a change in 
 150. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(a) (2009); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §21091 (West 2009). 
 151. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(b) (2009); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1503.1–1503.4 (2009); CAL. 
CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15088 (2009). 
 152. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15088(c) (2009). 
 153. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (2006); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.11 (2009). 
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result).  In sum, no American statutory system transfers so much 
information to the public.  No other statute mandates an 
informed dialogue between citizenry and government.  The 
central issue is how to empower citizens to make effective use of 
the information provided.  
B. The Reality of NEPA: The Creation of a New Class 
of 
Environmental Professional and the Rise of 
Expertise. 
Despite this de jure empowerment, NEPA and the little 
NEPA’s have operated to create a new forum for expertise more 
than empower the general public, and in the process these 
statutes have given rise to a new class of professionals.154
NEPA has created a new role for environmental consultants, 
both attorneys and other experts, and it is they who participate in 
the process, and they who “consume” the participation rights.  
The preparation of the environmental documents themselves 
requires expert consultants.  Agencies that typically undertake 
projects that may affect the environment have developed NEPA 
or CEQA compliance departments with specialists in the relevant 
disciplines, writers, editors, and production staff.
  This is 
where NEPA has worked its most profound change, an outcome 
that may appear paradoxical if viewed in light of NEPA’s focus on 
public participation, but is in fact most predictable in light of the 
need for expertise in environmental decision-making.  
155
 
 154. See Josh Ashenmiller, Paper Presentation at the annual Law and Society 
Ass’n meeting: Apres NEPA, Le Deluge: Citizen Suits and the Reported Demise 
of the Interests (May 27, 2004) (describing the rise of public-interest firms as an 
unintended consequence of NEPA). 
  In those 
states, such as California, where little NEPA’s apply not only to 
governmental projects, but to private projects subject to a govern-
mental discretionary permit, major project proponents either 
have such staffs dedicated to environmental document production 
or, more typically, supplement their internal capabilities with a 
retained consulting firm.  For many such consulting or engineer-
 155. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ORDER 451.1B, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY ACT COMPLIANCE PROGRAM, (2000), available at 
http://www.gc.energy.gov/NEPA/nepa_documents/TOOLS/ORDERS/o4511b.html  
(ordering, inter alia, the creation of a system of DOE NEPA compliance officers).  
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ing firms, preparation of environmental documents constitutes a 
major or even the sole source of their work.  These firms in turn 
sub-contract with a legion of environmental specialists. 
NEPA and its progeny increase the funds flowing to 
environmental specialties, and may be the reason that many of 
these sub-contractors exist.  The substantive design of programs 
or projects might employ some of these specialists, but the 
environmental documents create a substantial new market for 
their services that may exceed the market for experts who design 
the project itself.  The actual construction of a road, for example, 
would likely require one-time employment of a single traffic 
consultant by the sponsoring government or contractor.  Many 
different development projects will generate vehicle trips that use 
that road, however, and in jurisdictions which require an 
environmental document for such private projects, each 
environmental analysis must determine project contribution to 
the road in a separate environmental document based on the 
work of a consultant team created for that project.  Design of a 
multi-story commercial building requires an architectural firm, 
but its accompanying environmental document may require 
employ of traffic consultants who prepare cumulative scenarios 
addressing the transportation impact of the subject project 
together with all similar projects. 
Even where project proponents or programming agencies in 
environmentally sensitive jurisdictions would employ such 
expertise in program or project design itself, as opposed to in the 
environmental document, the original impetus came from the 
need to render the project attractive in light of the requirements 
of NEPA or CEQA.  CEQA, for example, requires that project 
approvals include adoption of mitigation monitoring plan that 
identifies all feasible mitigation measures, and determines where 
in the approval and operational life of the project such mitigation 
will apply.156
This demand for consultants works its way backward into the 
professional schools which respond by producing more planners, 
  Environmental consultants working for the EIR 
preparer develop the mitigation measures, and more consultants 
working on the project itself incorporate the measures into the 
project.  
 
 156. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21081.6 (West 2009). 
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wildlife biologists, traffic engineers, hydrologists and environ-
mental studies graduates than they otherwise would.157  The 
faculties from these schools teach in response to the demand, 
offering courses to prepare students for a career connected with 
these documents.  The class of professionals who produce these 
documents self-identify as environmental consultants and 
organize themselves into trade organizations such as the 
Association of Environmental Professionals.158  They offer 
seminars and conferences to their members, all addressing the 
issues surrounding environmental analysis, the preparation of 
environmental documents, and surviving the public comment 
process and rigors of forensic work in the possible ensuing 
litigation.159  This professional sub-class, almost non-existent 
before NEPA, now extends to those who work on projects in 
environmentally conscious jurisdictions without an environ-
mental impact-reporting requirement.  These jurisdictions 
require a similar substantive project analysis,160
NEPA also created roles for another key group of 
consultants: attorneys.  Attorneys attacked or defended EIS and 
EIR documents on legal grounds, beginning shortly after NEPA 
and CEQA were enacted.  These cases, usually brought in 
 often designed 
by professionals produced by curricula in turn created by the 
environmental reporting requirement.  These planners, 
engineers, and other professionals consciously mimic the 
substantive provisions of NEPA that require environmental 
analysis and the integration of mitigation measures into project 
design. 
 
 157. The National Association of Environmental Professionals offers itself in 
part as “a resource for structured career development from student 
memberships to certification as an environmental professional.” National 
Association of Environmental Professionals, http://www.NAEP.org/ (last visited 
Dec. 20, 2009). 
 158. Id.  
 159. Id. (advertising its annual conference and a NEPA working group for its 
members).   
 160. This is the case, for example, in Austin, Texas, where no state little 
NEPA exists, but “preserving the environment is as natural as breathing.” 
Austin-Bergstrom International Airport, http://www.ci.austin.tx.us/austinair 
port/projsumnr.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2009). “City codes require that site 
plan applications be reviewed for land use . . . environmental and safety 
considerations” despite the lack of a Texas NEPA equivalent. Austin City 
Connection, http://www.ci.austin.tx.us/development/spinfo1.htm (last visited 
Dec. 20, 2009).  
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summary proceedings on the basis of violation of statute or 
implementing guideline or regulation, focused on establishing the 
basic outlines of the judicial interpretation of the federal or state 
statute.161  The case law and legal literature today is rich indeed, 
addressing in multiple opinions issues such as the legally 
adequate discussion of environmental impacts,162 and the nature 
of the burden of establishing environmental significance.163 
Appellate laws addresses how decision-makers and reviewing 
courts act in the face of conflicting substantial evidence on the 
issue of environmental significance,164 what constitutes 
“environmental”165 or a “significant environmental effect,”166 
whether the statutory reporting obligation applies to government 
projects alone or to approvals of private projects,167 and what is 
the definition of a “cumulative impact.”168
 
 161. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy 
Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Envtl. Defense Fund v. Tenn. Valley 
Auth., 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972).  
 
 162. San Joaquin Raptor/Wildlife Rescue Ctr. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 
No. F041622, 2003 WL 21457054 (Cal. Ct. App. June 24, 2003) (holding that the 
EIR was legally adequate because it sufficiently identified, assessed, and 
mitigated the project’s impacts); Laurel Heights Improvement Ass’n of San 
Francisco v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 764 P.2d 278 (Cal. 1988). (holding an 
EIR to be insufficient due to its failure to adequately consider alternatives). 
163. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (2009); Dinah Bear, NEPA at 19: A Primer on an 
“Old” Law with Solutions to New Problems, 19 ENVTL. REP. 10060, 10064 
(1989),available at http://www.nepa.gov/nepa/regs/iii-11.pdf (explaining how 
courts have refrained from clearly defining “environmental significance” and 
have rather chosen to decide the issue on a case-by-case basis). 
 164. See Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that EIS 
should be prepared where there is a substantial dispute as to the size, nature, or 
affect of a major federal action).  
 165. See id. at 827 (holding that environmental effects that are potentially 
significant include noise, traffic, overburdened mass transportation systems, 
crime, congestion and availability of drugs). 
 166. See Hiram Clarke Civic Club v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973) 
(finding that “significant environmental effects” include all potential 
environmental effects, not only adverse ones). 
 167. Silva v. Romney, 473 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that a private 
activity requires and EIS where a significant nexus exists between a federal 
agency and a private entity); Found. on Econ. Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143 
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that a private party can be enjoined where its action 
could not lawfully take place without federal agency approval). 
 168. See Fritiofson v. Alexander, 772 F.2d 1225, 1241 n.10 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(noting that "[i]f proceeding with one project will, because of functional or 
economic dependence, foreclose options or irretrievably commit resources to 
future projects, the environmental consequences of the projects should be 
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But NEPA created new roles for attorneys as well.  As early 
as 1980, agencies hired my firm and others to “design” 
environmental review and to insure that environmental 
documents complied with the statute and evolving case law.  
Project proponents hired private environmental counsel to 
participate in project design with an eye towards the environ-
mental review process, to participate in the earliest stages of 
environmental document design, to work with public agencies 
and consultants to the extent permitted by law, to file comments 
on their own document if appropriate, to propose findings if 
required, and finally to participate in defense of the document if 
challenged in court.169
Project proponents, permitting authorities, sponsoring 
governments, and major intervenors constitute the clients for 
these attorneys and experts.  They make sophisticated use of the 
opportunities for scoping, formulation of new proposed 
alternatives to the project, and elaborate comment to bolster the 
direction they desire for the underlying project. 
 
C. Process Substitutes for Reality: The Use of NEPA 
to 
 Create Sham Participation. 
It is not as if citizen participants are absent.  Lay 
participants also write comments, submit them orally and in 
writing, and see written responses to their comments in the final 
document.  However, a class of professionals has emerged to 
facilitate and to contain this unassisted citizen participation.170
 
evaluated together." (citing Piedmont Heights Civic Club v. Moreland, 637 F.2d 
430, 439 (5th Cir. 1981))); 40 C.F.R. §1508.7 (1978) (defining “cumulative 
impact”). 
  A 
subset of communications or public relations consultants now 
 169. I worked throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s with and opposite developers’ 
counsel on these processes for California projects. Provisions of CEQA kept 
counsel for project-proponents at arms length during the preparation of an EIR 
(usually paid for by their clients) to protect the objectivity of the analysis. In 
fact, project proponents influence the documents by making their views known 
during scoping and, if necessary, by offering formal comments. Once the project 
is approved, agencies frequently seek project proponents’ advice during 
preparation of required findings, and may allow or require counsel for the 
project’s sponsor to take the lead in litigation defense and bear most of the cost 
of the litigation. 
 170. See Ashenmiller, supra note 154. 
53
MIHALY  
204 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  27 
specialize in providing decision-makers or project proponents 
with tools to create public participation programs.  A public 
university for example, may retain such consultants.  A city 
formally reviewing consultant teams to develop a complex project 
on city land may look favorably on a development proposal that 
includes a public participation communication consultant who 
will coordinate the public participation effort.  A project 
proponent may hire public relations experts to assist in their 
private efforts to achieve public acceptance for the project.171  
These consultants use various means to compile lists of interested 
parties among the public including adjoining property owners.  
They arrange the logistics for community meetings, facilitate 
agency workshops, and even provide support to public hearings.  
They also prepare project newsletters and other mailings for the 
public.172
Such activities can occasionally have positive effects that 
enhance public participation.  I have seen such consultants 
convince their clients of the depth of public opposition or the 
seriousness of a particular public concern.  But, more frequently, 
the decision-maker has no belief that these workshops or 
hearings will alter the nature of the project.  Their expectation, 
conscious or unconscious, anticipates a bifurcated input 
consisting of the real staff and expert testimony which will inform 
the decision, and the testimony of the general public which is 
something to be contained in a consultant-organized process 
consistent with legal requirements, and then lived through.  
Agencies expressly or impliedly instruct the communications 
consultant to insure that no one can contend he or she was not 
consulted, to insure that the appearance is one of exhaustive 
consultation and hearing, and to comply with every legal 
requirement.  
 
In many cases, the project proponent may hope (and in some 
cases may issue instructions such that) the consultant will 
identify nodes of opposition, and neutralize them by identifying 
 
 171. As counsel for citizen groups, I dealt frequently with such contractors. 
For cities engaging in the regulatory function of project review, I reviewed 
proposals containing such subcontractors, and in cases where I represented 
governmental entities as a project proponent, I worked as part of a team 
including such contractors. 
 172. Id. 
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wedge issues that divide the opposition effort or minor 
concessions that make it difficult to continue effective advocacy 
concerning the project.  Some complex stakeholder negotiations 
include a similar “public participation element,” but these efforts, 
with their email lists, list serves, newsletters, parallel public 
forums with choreographed breakout groups, have the same effect 
as such participatory programs in purely public processes; they 
almost never produce effect on the main course of the negotiation.  
The public is being processed, nothing more. 
Without so intending, and indeed usually intending 
vigorously the opposite, environmental impact report consulting 
firms frequently perform a form of the same sort of packaging to 
participation.  They facilitate and run early “scoping meetings,” 
required by NEPA,173
While these activities perform a useful function for the 
sophisticated participant,
 where community members are asked to 
provide their view of the environmental concerns that should be 
addressed in the draft EIS.  They attend the hearings where 
public testimony on the document is recorded, and they collate by 
subject matter both the written and oral public comment. 
174 for the unassisted lay participant 
they usually provide the appearance of participation without the 
substance.  Many of the NEPA/CEQA functions can be used to 
neutralize participation.  In my experience, professional EIR/EIS 
preparers possess strong environmental sentiments, believe 
projects should be designed to mitigate environmental impacts, 
and are devoted to the objectivity of their craft.  However, they 
operate in an environment where the likelihood of eventual 
litigation shapes almost all stages of their work, and where both 
the entity that pays them (the project sponsor) and that directs 
them (the regulating entity), sometimes one in the same, are 
strong proponents of the underlying endeavor.  Thus, consultants 
in many cases write carefully worded responses to public 
comments to provide the legally necessary information without 
answering the underlying concern expressed.175
 
 173. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (2009). 
  Depending on 
 174. See infra Part IV.  
 175. From the start of the process, the litigation-induced environment 
operates to make consultants behave as if they were attorneys (and sometimes 
induce attorneys to become professional consultants). This combines with the 
scientific drive for precision to make the language in the environmental 
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their objectivity versus responsiveness to the project proponent, 
consultants may respond to express or implied instructions to 
draft, or agencies themselves may draft documents to avoid, to 
the extent feasible, supplying project or program opponents with 
real information, which could lead to the revelation of new 
impacts or to realistic proposals to alter the project.176
The location of EIS/EIR administrative responsibilities 
within decision-making agencies reveals something about the 
value given the public input.  Most large agencies have separate 
internal divisions that deal with environmental impact analysis 
and manage the necessary consultant contracts.
 
177 Public 
communications efforts are frequently managed by ombudsmen 
or similar offices within agencies.178
In this environment, citizen testimony exists without effect, 
and neither constitutes a successful element of democracy nor 
  There exist arguable 
bureaucratic reasons for such specialization, but, while these sub-
entities may themselves become enclaves of environmental 
sentiment and proponents of public involvement, through their 
bureaucratic separateness they serve the purpose of isolating the 
actual decision-makers in the agency from the process of 
environmental analysis and public input.  Generally, the more 
managed the process, the less it matters to the ultimate decision, 
which arguably in some cases, is the goal of the agency decision-
makers.  
 
document, the response to comments, as conservative as possible, often making 
the document less comprehensible if more precise. 
 176. Capable project counsel realize there are limits to these efforts if one is to 
survive legal challenge, but devices for avoiding clear discussion of 
environmental negatives are legion. Simply encouraging the desire of a traffic 
consultant to be as precise as possible by qualifying her conclusions, for 
example, may make the results invisible to a lay person’s review. The most 
significant of these options relates to the design of project alternatives to avoid 
discussion of practical and environmentally superior options, and thus renders 
the proposed project as attractive as possible. See infra Part IV.A. 
 177. For example, the City and County of San Francisco has an Office of 
Environmental Review. While the director of this office reports to the Planning 
Director, all environmental review is carried out via a separate bureaucracy.  
Environmental reviews of energy proposals are carried out within a separate 
office of the California Public Utilities Commission. See ORDER 451.1B, supra 
note 155. 
 178. See Coalition of Federal Ombudsmen, Historical Perspective, 
http://ombudsman.ed.gov/federalombuds/history.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2009) 
(discussing the growth of the office and its role within federal agencies). 
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serves the purpose of legitimization.  Citizen activists may lack 
subject matter expertise, but they tend to have substantial, 
political expertise, and they know when they are being managed.  
I have seen citizens plead with an impassive commissioner, 
assigned to the unpleasant task of sitting with apparent interest 
through an early public hearing associated with the power line 
proceeding before the California Public Utilities Commission 
discussed infra.  One individual urged “please tell us that you 
haven’t made up your mind already.”  The official, who in my 
view, had no intention of voting against the line in any case, and 
thus had made up his mind, promised that he had not prejudged 
the case.  I do not believe the audience believed him.179
This sort of participation is corrosive, not conducive, to our 
polity and our democracy.  Advocates of participation contend 
that public involvement is not just an instrument of 
legitimization of government, but is an end in itself, a desirable 
element of democracy.
 
180
IV.  USING EXPERTS TO ASSIST CITIZEN 
PARTICIPATION. 
  This proposition suggests that the 
inverse is true as well:  if real participation is an intrinsic social 
positive, a manifestation of democracy, then unreal participation 
is a social negative and the manifestation of something other 
than democracy.  The impotency of unassisted lay testimony not 
only fails the promise of democracy, but also actively erodes the 
Civic Republican ideals.  Citizens who organize, come together, 
participate, and fail to effect results do not develop a sense of 
empowerment or new group identity. 
As discussed supra, public participation without expert 
assistance in the process of environmental decision-making gives 
an appearance of participation without substance.  As Professor 
Harder says, in such situations “participation is not participation, 
 
 179. Conversations with my clients, one of whom uttered the quoted question, 
indicated deep cynicism about the statement. At the end of the formal 
administrative proceeding on the power line itself, the assigned administrative 
law judge ruled against the line. The assigned Commissioner who had made the 
above quoted statement voted against the project until he determined it would 
pass in any event and then changed his vote.  
 180. Fiorno, supra note 38, at 239. 
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but is merely an opportunity to transmit views.”181
Presentations to government are undertaken for a variety of 
purposes, sometimes articulated and sometimes not.  Frequently, 
the goal is in fact the transmission of the information in the 
testimony.  The presentation may also be part of a complex 
advocacy effort which goes beyond the communication of 
substantive position.  Possible goals include placing political 
pressure on a swing vote, creating the foundation for political 
change in the make-up of the subject decision-making body, or 
simple delay, especially if the underlying endeavor involves time-
sensitive financing arrangements.  Regardless of the motive, the 
potential effectiveness is qualitatively changed for the better by 
use of substantive experts, both because of the information 
produced and for the impression created by the expert presence 
per se.  Agents familiar with the forum add to this partnership; 
they provide strategic assistance, organizational advice, and may 
coordinate elements of the participation.  These are usually 
attorneys, but may be other types of professional advocates.   
  Members of 
the public miss statutory or regulatory deadlines and fail to 
exhaust their legal remedies sufficiently to meet standing 
requirements.  Their comments do not compete on a technical 
level with the input of stakeholder and staff, proponents, and 
organized stakeholders.  The process of environmental review 
serves primarily as a post hoc rationalization for a previously 
determined project design or rule formulation, and participation 
consultants or staff integration of the unassisted lay citizen into a 
process designed to give the appearance of participation without 
effect on the decision-makers.  Sophisticated representation and 
use of experts can change this trajectory.  A thoughtful 
partnership of citizens and experts can move the participatory 
effort from a mere expression of position to an effective force, one 
that reverses unstated agreements among project proponents and 
the agency, and brings citizens to the bargaining table with some 
significant power to exercise. 
The following section illustrates the nature of such a 
partnership using the NEPA process as an example.  As discussed 
infra, NEPA, as evolved, poses formidable barriers to truly 
 
 181. Professor Harder, Presentation for Vt. Law Sch. in Montpelier, Vt. (June 
5, 2009). 
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effective citizen participation, but if used in conjunction with 
partnership of citizens, agents, and experts, the same statutes 
can also create citizen power.  This illustration is followed by a 
more general discussion of the nature of such a partnership, and 
questions of funding. 
A. NEPA Redux: Effective Citizen Participation 
EIS/EIR Process by Use of Expertise. 
 One must start with the hard reality that in the usual case 
today few parties participate in the environmental review process 
simply in order to produce environmental information.  In the 
case of physical projects, proponents use it to produce political 
and legal justification of the project design.  Opponents hope to 
use the process of environmental review to alter or stop approval 
of the project, to catalyze political opposition and sway a swing 
vote, or simply to create delay in the hope that political efforts or 
time will allow the situation to re-coalesce in a pattern more 
favorable to the advocates.  Where environmental review is 
conducted in connection with planning, formulation of policy or 
rules, again stakeholders want to use the documents to influence 
the outcome directly or politically.  In any case, all parties view 
the document through the lens of potential litigation, either 
defensively if they prevail in the proceeding or offensively if they 
should not.  It is the rare citizen who possesses genuine, neutral 
curiosity regarding the environmental impacts of a project, and 
only the very occasional project proponents who anticipate the 
likelihood that newly revealed information could cause them to 
alter the subject project. 
Nor is the environmental documentation the usual source for 
environmental information used to design the subject project or 
animate the subject planning or policy determination.  Two or 
three decades ago, agencies and project developers frequently 
lacked the internal environmental capacity to incorporate 
appropriate environmental features or mitigation measures into 
the project or policy design, and thus relied, or were, in the 
eventuality forced to rely to some extent on the information 
produced in the EIS or EIR.  Today that is rare; proponents know 
at the start the likely array of environmental mitigation or 
alternations.  Well before the draft EIS or EIR is produced, 
proponents, private or public, possess or separately retain the 
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expertise necessary to anticipate almost all likely environmental 
issues, and make the trade-offs among environmental issues, 
capital and operating cost based on internal, technical and 
political calculus.  The project, including its environmental 
components or lack of them, is “baked” separately from and 
usually in advance of the environmental review process. 
In my own practice and in consultation with other counsel 
involved in document “design,” I found that this separation of 
functions flows from the logistics of project review as much as any 
anti-environmental animus.  Even for those project or policy 
proponents motivated in significant part by concern for the 
environment, the nature and timing of the environmental review 
process make it dauntingly difficult to utilize the effort for the 
very purposes the law intends—to encourage iteration and 
adoptions of environmentally superior alternatives and 
incorporate environmental mitigation measures into design.  The 
project and environmental review schedules conflict, and the 
personnel involved in the two efforts are different.  Private 
projects are designed prior to commencing the public review 
process.  The developer needs internal staff and consultants loyal 
to it, and privy to considerations which will never become public.  
Public projects, whether concrete public development projects or 
processes such as a new set of regulations for a federal agency or 
a new land use plan for a city, involve teams of staff or outside 
experts assembled early and frequently consulted for strategic 
purposes. 
  Environmental review, by contrast, is undertaken by 
separate staff dedicated to that purpose, or by consulting EIS or 
EIR consultants that specialize in the preparation of such 
documents.  Regulations or practice strive to separate the 
environmental document production from undue influence by the 
project proponent, if private.  Thus, while it may be theoretically 
desirable that the two groups overlap, trust each other, or 
produce information in a format or on a schedule that would 
allow the preparation of the environmental document to inform 
the design of the project, it does not occur.  The environmental 
review processes, attendant public disclosure requirements, and 
the culture of environmental review staffs make the review 
process public and permeable, discouraging early or frank 
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exchange of information between project and environmental 
review teams. 
Thus, participation must begin and end with the 
understanding that the intent is to use the environmental review 
process to open up a closed and largely completed process, not 
simply to await its revelatory outcome.  Some citizen participants 
posses such a frank and instrumental understanding from the 
start; they know that they desire to stop or alter a project they 
consider environmentally unacceptable in its current form, or to 
delay the project pending a possible political shift.  Many citizens 
however, commence the process with a faith that revelation of 
adverse environmental information in the document will achieve 
their purpose.  The first role for expertise, whether attorney, 
planner or other individuals with prior experience, involves 
disabusing such participants of the value or raw information. 
Agencies and project proponents usually know how to prepare 
documents that, while legally adequate, present adverse 
information in ways that support rather than derail the project’s 
public trajectory, whether by the manner in which the 
information is presented, by clever incorporation of the 
information into mitigation measures which will delay 
confrontation with the more difficult questions, or by mis-
designed alternatives to the project.  Thus, true change to the 
course set by project proponents requires strategic use of the 
process rather than participation in it. 
Such a successful NEPA citizen effort requires the 
collaboration of experts and attorneys.  The experts must have 
excellent credentials, and likely have participated in the EIS or 
EIR process before.  The attorney or other agent must understand 
the nuances of underlying environmental process.  A successful 
use of the NEPA process to alter the course of a project, to 
comment with effect, requires, as in most complex efforts, those 
who have been there before. 
In the early scoping process, for example, agencies (or project 
proponents acting through the agencies) structure the required 
“alternatives to the project” for analysis in the full document.182
 
 182. 40 C.F.R. §1508.25(b) (2009); 40 C.F.R. §1502.14 (2009); CAL. CODE REGS.  
tit. 14, § 15126.6 (2009). 
  
Agencies, simply though the pursuit of administrative 
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commitment to what staff perceives as the best project, will 
frequently create alternatives that show the project as proposed 
in its best light.  Environmentally superior alternatives can be 
made unnecessarily extreme, financially unrealistic, or designed 
to bundle environmentally superior elements with 
environmentally or socially undesirable elements.  In complex 
endeavors, containing dozens or even hundreds of potential 
elements, alternatives for consideration must consist of groupings 
of sub-options.  These bundles can be “designed” to advantage one 
approach over another.  Environmental review of energy supply 
options, for example, might disadvantage wind by bundling it 
with solar which is similarly intermittent and more expensive 
rather than natural gas, and might create an unrealistic 
transmission scenario.  An early opposition effort involves 
pointing out the tactic, and structuring and proposing other 
environmentally superior alternatives that may be more realistic.  
The successful “invention” and advocacy of an alternative, 
one that may be quite unwelcome to agency staff or existing 
stakeholders, must be so convincing that the agency or 
proponent’s counsel will advise that a conservative litigation 
prevention strategy requires inclusion of the alternative in the 
environmental document.  Iteration and advocacy of such an 
“alternative” strategy involves prior analysis of impacts to ensure 
the alternative indeed has fewer impacts, no fatal non-
environmental impacts and can meet the underlying project 
objective.  The analysis typically requires consultants to create a 
true alternative vision for the proposed project and to 
demonstrate its superiority and financial feasibility.  An 
alternative to a land use plan, for example, would involve land 
use planners, traffic engineers, and development economists.  
Essentially, the effort assembles a parallel staff for the citizen led 
position.  The alternative can be presented during scoping or as a 
comment on the draft EIS or draft EIR. 
During the time the agency (or its consultants) is preparing 
the draft document, the community advocates or environmental 
group, assisted by its attorney, finalizes the assembly of this team 
of consultants, prepares budgets and contracts, all so that when 
the draft EIS or EIR emerges, the team can prepare and submit 
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comments by the deadline, often sixty days or less.183
B.   The Role of the Citizen in Partnership with 
Attorneys and Experts: Civic Virtue In this 
Context. 
  Citizen 
leadership and attorneys determine which portions of the draft 
report go to which consultants, review their written material, and 
compile a substantive and procedural response submitted as a 
public comment.  In the case of a large project where the 
environmental document may be thousands of pages long, the 
resulting citizen comment and its appendices can be hundreds of 
pages and cost the client tens of thousands of dollars in expert 
and attorney effort.  Such trenchant comments, produced at the 
same or better level of expertise as the original document can 
actually alter the course of events, either slowing the agencies 
progress, forcing it to alter the project, galvanizing opposition 
within the agency, changing a swing vote on a commission, or, in 
the event of an inadequate response to the document, provide the 
basis for judicial invalidation. 
Does the dominance of attorneys and experts in such a 
complex intervention dull the transformative nature of the 
participatory experience or otherwise reduce the likelihood of the 
entry of new groups into the political process?184  Certainly, it 
could, and some proponents of the Civic Republican ideal caution 
against represented participation on those grounds.185
 
 183. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21091 (West 2009) (discussing how the CEQA 
requires a minimum of 30 days); 40 C.F.R. § 1506.10 (2009) (discussing how 
NEPA requires a minimum of 45 days for comments).  
  There is a 
dearth of systematic quantitative research on this question; such 
research which would be difficult to conduct due to the variety of 
participatory efforts, the frequently multiple actors within the 
 184. See Jonathan Poisner, A Civic Republican Perspective on the National 
Environmental Policy Act’s Process for Citizen Participation, 26 ENVTL. L. 53, 67-
68 (1996) (asserting that lay participation forces policy makers to adopt 
language that lay persons understand—thus creating dialogue that invites more 
to participate. Expert participation, on the other hand, encourages the use of 
technical language that lay participants find so impenetrable). 
 185. Id. at 90 (noting that “[i]n general, the synoptic format encourages 
passivity and over reliance on experts. Agencies present material in a way that 
discourages participation. At best, citizens walk away from the process feeling 
they lack the ability to participate. At worst . . . citizens may become 
increasingly cynical and distrustful of government.”).  
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groups involved, and the breadth and likely contradictory 
accounts of the lay and expert participants. 
It is not difficult to imagine a negative outcome, however, 
based simply on the usual model where an attorney represents a 
relatively unsophisticated client.  The relationship consists 
largely of a flow from client to attorney of basic sensory or 
experiential information, and payment.  The attorney relates to 
the forum alone unless it involves the client’s testimony, and even 
there, the client may simply present the lines written, or at least 
designed by the attorney.  It is contemplation of this sort of 
passive participation that animates Civic Republican opposition 
to representation.186
Yet, for all the reasons discussed, unrepresented 
participation usually leads nowhere.  Fortunately, while 
representation, if poorly done, can detract from the civic 
experience, collaboration between citizens and a team of 
attorneys and experts can animate participation and transform 
the individuals involved into political participants in ways 
neither they nor their experts imagined. 
   
At the outset, it must be recognized that although citizens 
involved in environmental disputes may lack subject matter 
expertise, they usually are intelligent, active, experienced in life, 
and politically sophisticated, or rapidly become so.  Frequently, I 
found their intelligence and political judgment surpassed that of 
their representatives and their experts.  The lay participants 
must, of necessity, take the lead in such major tasks as political 
or community organization, building alliances and coordination 
among groups, raising funds, and frequently, on site fact-finding.  
The citizen role, however, should extend into collaboration on 
strategy, tactics, and the use of experts.  It is the very application 
of a citizen’s pre-existing capabilities and experience to the 
acquisition of those skills—how to design a regulatory 
intervention—that can transform a single-issue and first-time 
participant into a continuing activist who may enter electoral life 
or take appointive office. 
The citizen-attorney-expert relationship must take the form 
of dialogue where the exchange determines the strategic course.  
 
 186. See id. See also Weng, supra note 58 (discussing the unequal power 
hierarchy between lay and expert participation resulting in superficial public 
participation). 
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The opposition to the proposed San Diego Gas and Electric Valley 
Rainbow 500kV interconnect187 provides an example.  My role 
was to advise the incipient group of citizen participants who knew 
nothing about the transmission and distribution grid, energy 
regulation, or the politics of state energy planning.  I told them 
that in the then political climate in California (during the power 
crisis provoked by the combination of poor restructuring and 
Enron market manipulation),188
Some of the citizen participants must acquire substantive 
expertise in order to provide the political and policy direction the 
attorney and expert team needs at critical junctures in the work.  
They work with the attorney and consultant team, and over the 
course of preparation of testimony and meetings with staff or 
project proponents, they learn to structure the course of the 
proceeding.  Strategic choices usually need inputs that go beyond 
the expertise of the attorney or experts; such decisions integrate 
litigation and presentation issues with which the attorney is 
 pure opposition to the entire 
power corridor was unlikely to show success, and that we would 
be forced into an “elsewhere” argument, pushing the line to the 
least visible alternative within their valley.  They needed to hear 
this information, but I needed to hear the response it evoked:  the 
group told me that they were not interested in undertaking a 
locational fight for two reasons.  First, they felt determined to 
support the economic development of the region and the state, 
and thus believed that if our own independent investigation 
revealed that the power line was necessary on reliability and 
economic grounds, it should be built regardless of visual and 
property impact.  Second, from a tactical perspective, they 
indicated that an effort to push for one route over others would 
divide the community and undermine the fundraising and 
political effort necessary for success.  Thus, for them, the case 
could only proceed if our experts determined that the line was 
unnecessary to the grid, which in fact, somewhat to my surprise, 
is what occurred. 
 
 187. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. (U 902-E), Application 01-03-036 at 6  (Cal. 
Pub. Utils. Comm’n Mar. 23, 2001) (Application for Certificate of Public 
Convenience & Necessity); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., Application No. 04-06-011 
at 37, (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n 2001).  
 188. Timothy P. Duane, Regulation’s Rationale: Learning From the California 
Energy Crisis, 19 YALE  J. ON REG. 471 (2002).  
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familiar with goals, financial capabilities, and political questions 
the participants must decide. 
Participants must come to understand the underlying 
subjects because they will eventually find themselves in 
situations where they need the knowledge.  In many cases, the 
participatory effort leads not to a result, but a new process.  
Forcing one’s way to the table leads to the table, and then the 
true negotiation begins.  Such negotiations rapidly reach the 
moment when agencies and project proponents need to know 
what the citizen participants want, not in general, but with all the 
specificity that real change to a project or process demands.  
Nothing presents more difficulties than answering that question, 
an effort that requires the combination of self-understanding and 
subject matter expertise that only a citizen who has participated 
in the ways discussed here can provide.  While attorneys and 
experts may staff the formulation of goals, presenting 
alternatives, setting likely boundaries of success, it is the citizen 
leadership that must make the educated choices as to trade-off 
and compromise. 
Perhaps the most direct connection between representation 
and the development of civic virtue is the very fact of success.  It 
is transforming and empowering to watch an agency adopt one’s 
comments, to find oneself really at the table negotiating the 
actual outcome of a project or process.  As witness to such 
profound personal change, I believe that the mere act of 
participation without effect, that some contend is enough, is in 
fact a pale second, bearing no relationship to the real thing. 
C.  Citizen Participants Similarly Need Attorney-
Expert Assistance in Alternative Governance 
Processes. 
Advocates of public participation and innovation in 
governance have in the last few decades articulated and 
experimented with new processes to facilitate participation.  
While these devices make participation easier and more broad-
based, they do not substitute for the need to incorporate expertise 
and representation in the participatory effort, and may in fact 
pose greater barriers to citizen entry and successful participation 
than more traditional processes.  Regardless of the innovative 
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forum or new technology, the factors discussed in this article 
remain in place.   
For example, the movement for processes loosely labeled 
“collaborative governance” embraces a suite of changes designed 
to bring the insights of alternative dispute resolution to 
traditional governmental processes.189  Seeking ways both to 
empower stakeholders and to maintain governing momentum in 
subject areas characterized by prolonged controversy, 
politicization of regulatory issues or stalemate, advocates for 
reform urge the creation of stakeholder groups to supplement 
formal processes, usually early in the proceedings or even before 
the proceedings commence.  These efforts, such as ad hoc 
committees or consensus committees, or discussions and 
negotiations with no label at all, range in origin, form, and 
formality; some efforts are convened through unilateral efforts of 
a project proponent, some by potential stakeholders, and others 
by the regulatory entity.  If convened through the latter, the 
agency may provide an option or a mandate of pre-application 
procedures, extended notice periods, and informational sessions.  
The staff of the regulatory body may or may not have a role in 
sponsoring (as in informational sessions) or participating in the 
process.190
This effort, in its most articulated form, takes the form of 
negotiated rulemaking.  After almost a decade of formulation,
 
191 
the process is now articulated in the federal law.192
 
 189. See e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Government in the Administrative 
State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1997) (discussing various EPA negotiations that 
convene stakeholders and EPA staff  “facilitates” the negotiation process).  
  Whether 
undertaken pursuant to federal law, or formal or informal action 
 190. Sean F. Nolon, Lawyer as Process Advocate: How to Encourage 
Collaboration in Land Use Decision-making, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 103 (2009). 
 191. William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory 
Negotiation and the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L. J. 1351  (1997) 
(discussing evolution and early history of the Negotiated Rulemaking Act and 
creation of federal legislation); Harter, Negotiating Regulations, supra note 61; 
Harter, Experienced Practitioner Offers Guidance to Participants in Negotiated 
Rule Making, supra note 122; Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Achieving Policymaking 
Consensus: The (Unfortunate) Waning of Negotiated Rulemaking, 48 S. TEX. L. 
REV.  987, 987-88 (2008) (discussing the history of the ADR movement and early 
formation).  
 192. Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C. § 561 (2006); 
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C. § 571 (2006). 
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by state agencies, negotiated rulemaking involves the assembly 
by a sponsoring governmental entity of what some convener 193 
deems to constitute the group of stakeholders representing all 
relevant interests, the creation of a structured forum, up-front 
agreement by potential participants to stay with the process and 
support the result, and participate in the process itself in good 
faith.194  The parties negotiate a rule or aspect of a rule, and 
produce a public report on the outcome, which is presented to the 
agency as part of its subsequent statutory formal or informal 
rulemaking.195
These additions to the suite of governance devices can 
operate to reduce the barriers to entry described in this article, 
but not necessarily.
 
196  Someone has to convene the negotiating 
group, and then make determinations on who may subsequently 
participate.  Under the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, only those 
selected by the convener can participate.197  The outreach can be 
undertaken in ways that encourage participation of a full variety 
of interests including individual and loosely organized groups of 
citizens, but the outreach can be designed to discourage such 
participation.  Determinations by conveners are not subject to 
judicial review.198
 
 193. 5 U.S.C. § 563(b) (2006).  
  Individual citizens or ad hoc citizen groups 
may not be permitted to participate.  Citizen participants may 
come late to a process of which they were unaware.  Such groups 
may be slow to organize, coalescing as part of reactive process 
that takes time.  The very consensual dynamics of the process 
may cause those stakeholders already ‘inside’ to join the 
convening agency or private proponent in opposing the new 
entrants.  In that event, participants will need to fight their way 
in, again, with the assistance of representation and expertise. 
 194. 5 U.S.C. § 563(a)(3)(b) (2006); see also Freeman, supra note 189. 
 195. 5 U.S.C. § 566 (2006); see Harter, Negotiating Regulations, supra note 61; 
Harter Interview, supra note 76; see also Philip J. Harter, Assessing the 
Assessors: The Actual Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. 
L. J. 32, 40-41 (2000) (describing the success of negotiated rulemaking).  
 196. See Funk, When Smoke Gets In Your Eyes, supra note 64 (arguing that 
negotiating regulations subverts public participation and the public interest); 
but see Freeman & Langbein, supra note 64 (arguing that consensual 
rulemaking increases the legitimacy of agency rulemaking).  
 197. 5 U.S.C. § 565(a) (2006). 
 198. See Nat’l Res. Defense Council v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1988).  
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Expertise and strategy will prevail in the negotiation itself, 
perhaps even more so than a traditional forum.  While the 
informal nature of stakeholder negotiation may present the 
appearance of a more novice-friendly environment, the absence of 
formalized structure and fluidity of process all present 
opportunities for experts and agents familiar with the forum to 
structure the negotiation ad hoc in ways that advantage one 
stakeholder position or another.  The negotiation or other 
informal processes can take more time, and more unstructured 
time than formal processes, taxing the resources of citizens who 
have full time employment elsewhere, and requiring expenditure 
of more resources for experts or attorneys.  While administrative 
proceedings are notoriously expensive, prolonged and active 
negotiations are usually even worse.  No ex parte or other rules 
apply; parties meet with each other and caucus, and experts from 
different interests discuss options in side meetings.  These 
meetings may have no notice or minutes.  Citizens need to bring 
the same expertise and persistent professional presence to these 
various sub-negotiations as the organized stakeholders. 
Nor is the negotiation the end of the matter.  While it is more 
likely that an agency that employs negotiated rulemaking intends 
to take the results into account, nothing in the law guarantees 
this result.  By law, agencies must retain discretion to act after 
the required formal process.199  The agency, for good reason, may 
elect a different route than recommended by the negotiants.200
More fundamentally, the stated goal of the negotiation 
process, consensus among stakeholders, may operate to the 
detriment of citizens who hope to influence an agency to pursue 
the interest of the broader public, especially if that interest 
  
Nothing protects the participants from an agency’s strategic use 
of the process to give the appearance of participation without 
giving it substantive effect.  Citizens need a team of experts and 
attorneys or other agents capable of presenting their case fully 
before the final trier of fact. 
 
 199. Harter, Negotiating Regulations, supra note 61, at 20; see Administrative 
Conference of the U.S., Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations, 1 
C.F.R. § 305.82-.84 (2009). For a concise history of the process leading to the 
Negotiated Rulemaking Act see  Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium, 
supra note 191, at nn. 2-7 and accompanying text.  
 200. See USA Group Loan Servs., Inc. v. Riley, 82 F.3d 708, 714-15 (7th Cir. 
1996). 
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involves denial of a project or adoption of a rule or policy not 
advocated by any of the more powerful stakeholders.  In the land 
use arena, for example, many environmental habitats cannot 
support a proposed project in any form, or cannot support a size 
or density of development that makes financial sense for the 
instant proponent developer.  In those cases, no consensus 
process will work.  The regulatory entity should find its way, 
through presentation of evidence and deliberation, to disapproval 
of the project, a result unlikely to emerge from stakeholder 
negotiations.  It is certain that a wise project proponent may use 
negotiations to take the temperature of the political environment 
and conclude that it should abandon a project, but more 
frequently, the developer will lack that flexibility if pre-
committed to the project due to internal politics or financial 
status (for example, the developer that owns the subject property 
in fee rather than having optioned it), and in that case may 
attempt to use the negotiations to co-opt citizens or cause the 
fragmentation of opposition. 
In the case of negotiated rulemaking, this intrinsic conflict 
between stakeholder goals and the public interest sought by 
citizens can be severe, especially in cases of environmental 
concerns such as climate where society must make fundamental 
changes to address realities increasingly apparent to the 
scientific community.  The current efforts to enact cap-and-trade 
legislation reveal the paralysis that an over-empowered group of 
current stakeholders can impose on government.  In rulemaking 
environments, the informal pressure established stakeholders 
exercise may already be too great; negotiated rulemaking gives 
those forces an additional forum.  This is especially the case 
where the rule-maker staff joins the negotiation as equal 
negotiants.  Citizens may be enamored initially of an informal 
opportunity to dialogue with agency staff, but, again, it is the 
more sophisticated stakeholders who know how to utilize that 
connection in ways that can influence the final rulemaking body 
to abdicate its responsibility to pursue the interest of the broader 
pubic.  More than a decade ago, Professor Funk raised this issue: 
“the incentives to make negotiated rulemaking . . . undermine 
and subvert the principles underlying traditional administrative 
law by elevating the importance of consensus among the parties 
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above the law, the facts, or the public interest.”201
Other processes such as stakeholder advisory groups and 
deliberative polling, though innovative and useful, do not change 
the fundamental calculus.  Advisory groups can be powerful 
influences, devices for true participation, if they have a source of 
funds and the independence necessary to retain their own 
representation and expertise.  Funding is rare, and even where 
funding is available, independence is a difficult issue to navigate 
when those funds are provided by the sponsoring government or 
project proponent.  Absent that expertise, such advisory groups or 
boards become dependant on agency staff.  Deliberative polling
  This 
negotiation forum, then, possesses all the same challenges for 
citizens as the more formal processes, in addition to those 
processes, and thus requires that their effort be undertaken in 
partnership with a team of experts and agents familiar with the 
forum involved. 
202
Finally, many agencies have offices that assist lay 
participation in the presentation of environmental issues, 
sometimes labeled ombudsmen.
 
involves much larger groups of lay participants who meet, answer 
questions, receive information, and then answer questions again.  
This process is subject to all the sorts of manipulation discussed 
in this article unless the information provided is in some form 
independent, an outcome difficult to arrange in most situations. 
203  These solutions have thrived 
in other countries. 204
 
 201. Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium, supra note 191, at 1387.  
  Many models already exist here.  These 
include bureaucracies or portions thereof dedicated to 
representation of consumer interests in public utility proceedings.  
 202. James S. Fishkin, Consulting the Public—Thoughtfully, 12 DISP. RESOL. 
MAG. 11, 11-12 (2006) (the creator, and owner of the trademark for “deliberative 
polling” defining “deliberative polling); The Center for Deliberative Democracy, 
Deliberative Polling, http://cdd.stanford.edu/polls/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2009).  
203. Gregory R. Bockin & Scott N. Flesch, From Problem Solver to Policeman: 
The Ombudsmen Role in Army Compliance Agreements, ARMY LAW., Oct. 2005, 
at 53, 56 (describing how the army implements ombudsmen and “[s]tate and 
international governments also assist small businesses and individuals by 
employing ombudsmen in varying capacities.”); Utah Office of Property Rights 
Ombudsman, http://propertyrights.utah.gov (last visited Dec. 20, 2009).  
 204. Elizabeth Barrett Ristroph, How Can the U.S. Correct Multi-National 
Corporations’ Environmental Abuses Committed in the Name of Trade, 15 INT’L. 
& COMP. L. REV. 51, 27, 83 n.153 (2004) (explaining how a system found in Italy 
would be a good model for “environmental ombudsmen”).  
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For example, the Vermont Department of Public Service is itself 
charged with the representation of consumer interests on energy 
and telecommunication issues.205  The California Public Utilities 
Commission possesses within it the Division of Ratepayer 
Advocates, which reviews proceedings and selectively intervenes 
to represent what it perceives as ratepayer concerns.206  At a 
broader level, the California Attorney General is charged by 
statute not only with the representation of state agencies in court 
but also generally with taking steps necessary, including 
intervention in any proceeding, on behalf of the people of the 
state to protect the state’s environment.207
These approaches depend on enthusiasm for the subject 
matter of the current political regime.  The California Attorney 
General’s office in the early 1970s had an independent 
environmental unit to carry out its obligations to protect the 
environment.
 
208  The attorneys in that unit intervened in 
appellate cases and initiated proceedings to set environmental 
precedent, to create new paths for environmental enforcement 
and to create new approaches to environmental law.209  Cases 
frequently involved partnership with citizens who shared 
environmental goals.  These efforts were sustained under a 
moderate Republican, and Democratic Attorney Generals who 
supported such work, but, the effort was frustrated and the unit 
disbanded under an attorney general hostile to the environmental 
endeavor.210
The work of the California Public Utilities Commission 
(PUC) Office of Ratepayer Advocates illustrates other problems.  
This small group of advocates within the California PUC 
bureaucracy has the power to dedicate substantial resources to 
selected interventions in PUC proceedings where it deems 
 
 
 205. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 2 (2009). 
 206. See CA.gov, Welcome to the Division of Ratepayer Advocates, 
http://www.dra.ca.gov/dra/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2009).  
 207. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 12606 (1971). 
 208. See PETER WATHERN, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 179 (1990). 
 209. Id. 
 210. See id. (explaining that California Attorney General George Deukmejian 
dismantled the environmental unit of the California Attorney General’s office).  
I worked in the Environmental Unit of the California Attorney General’s office 
during this dismantling. 
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important consumer interests are at stake.211  Despite that 
charge and effect, the Office has been consistently under-funded, 
and the more aggressive its representation of consumer interests, 
the more it becomes isolated within the PUC staff bureaucracy.212  
It also provides an escape valve whereby the rest of the PUC staff 
effort is relieved of the need to represent consumer interests.213
Any ombudsman effort will need to address these typical 
problems. How does one maintain staff élan in the face of 
consistent hostility?  How does one maintain funding and 
independent integrity?  How should we avoid the tendency of 
bureaucracy to leave citizen concerns to ombudsmen offices?  Who 
selects the ombudsman and staff and how should we insulate 
such positions from political manipulation over time? 
 
Recently, technological improvements have facilitated each of 
these modern governance reforms.  Deliberative polling can be 
done remotely; governments are broadcasting meetings and 
opening blogs to facilitate citizen comment.  Under President 
Obama, the White House has created a website and a blog.214  
The President himself has encouraged the use of Facebook 215 and 
Twitter216
D.  Providing Funding for Experts and 
Representation to Citizen Participants. 
 to facilitate citizen participation.  It is self-evident that 
these technological improvements will make participation easier, 
but do nothing to ensure that the government listens to the input 
or gives this participation effect.  The complexities, possibilities 
for agency manipulation, and the need for expertise described 
herein remain. 
If we believe in the underlying purpose of public 
participation, we must equip citizens with the agents and experts 
 
 211. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 309.5 (West 2009). 
 212. Interview with Steven Weissman, former administrative law judge for the 
Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, at Vt. Law Sch., South Royalton, Vt. (July 7, 2009) (on 
file with author). 
 213. Id. 
 214. See The White House Blog, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/ (last visited 
Dec. 20, 2009).   
 215. See Facebook, President Barack Obama, http://www.facebook.com/barack 
obama (last visited Oct. 12, 2009). 
 216. See Twitter, Barak Obama, http://twitter.com/BARACKOBAMA (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2009).  
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they need to make their participation authentic and effective.  
With the assistance of such expertise, citizens can usually find 
ways to participate in stakeholder negotiations and the other 
quasi-public forums where environmental decision-making 
increasingly occurs.  Assisted by these experts and attorneys, lay 
participants can fulfill most of the multiple purposes of public 
participation set forth in the aggregate list in Section I supra,217 
providing relevant and objectively valuable information to a 
decision-making process sought by the rationalists, and providing 
new stakeholder views in the pluralist stakeholder negotiation.218
The provision of sophisticated representation and expertise 
requires a system to compensate participants for the actual costs 
associated with the participation effort, typically fees and costs of 
experts and attorneys, as well as filing, copying and travel 
expenses.
  
The use of expertise and representation to attain the Civic 
Republican virtues presents a more complex terrain, possibly 
discouraging, but potentially enabling the formation of new civic 
identity depending on the nature of the relationship, as is 
discussed above. 
219
 
 217. See supra Part I.C. 
  Some private project proponents have come to 
recognize that discussions with serious and empowered 
stakeholders provide such a substantial return in the form of 
project facilitation that they fund the representation and experts 
necessary for the lay participants.  For example, a private 
developer of power lines in Wisconsin offers such expertise to 
 218. See supra Part I.B and accompanying footnotes. That is, where ideas can 
compete on their merit, rather than on the funding behind them. It seems as if 
some have confounded the former with the latter; they think that an idea must 
not have worth if it cannot find a funder. My proposal here is aimed at equalize 
the funding to insure true competition. 
 219. See e.g., U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Collaboration and Partnerships, 
http://www.epa.gov/innovation/collaboration/Local_Regional%20Partnerships/En
vironmentalJusticeCollaborativeProblem-SolvingModel.htm (last visited Dec. 
20, 2009) (discussing the environmental justice community example of 
Spartansburg,, South Carolina); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1801 (West 2009) 
(stating that “to provide compensation for reasonable advocate’s fees, reasonable 
expert witness fees, and other reasonable costs to public utility customers of 
participation or intervention in any proceeding of the commission.”); 65-407-840 
ME. CODE R. § 7 (Weil 2009). 
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affected individuals and groups.220
In my role as counsel to community groups on land use 
issues, I entered prolonged and complex negotiations with 
developers.  In most such cases, the expense of a well-conducted 
and expert-supported negotiation exceeded the resources of my 
client.  I was required to explain to counsel for the developer that 
we could only negotiate if the developer paid for my time and 
expert fees.  More thoughtful developers decided to invest the 
funds, usually, but not always, with an outcome superior to 
litigation.  Note, however, that the suggestion that developers 
fund the negotiations was frequently met with incredulity:  
“What?  You mean you want us to pay for our lawyers and your 
lawyers?”  Sometimes the concern was simply money, but more 
frequently the developer was animated by precisely the 
knowledge that underlies this article; without representation, lay 
participants are powerless, but with expertise and 
representation, they can make a difference.  Developers with less 
foresight (or depending on the situation, with more foresight) had 
counted on exploiting the difference in expert resources.  As 
discussed above, negotiations only work where compromise is, in 
light of all risks and benefits, a better outcome than a “no” for the 
project. 
  The innovative participatory 
devices in collaborative governance may provide a vehicle where a 
special concern for citizen participation animates the sponsoring 
agency to fund the effort, to provide a quasi- independent expert 
to staff a citizen advisory committee, or to provide assistance to 
lay citizens in a negotiated rulemaking. 
To democratize effective participation, we need go beyond 
these negotiated funding approaches to find a broadly applicable 
funding mechanism.  Such an endeavor would go beyond existing 
federal and state attorneys’ fee statutes221
 
 220. Am. Transmission Co. Representative, Panel Remarks at the U.S. Dep’t 
of Energy—Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs Electric Reliability Forum 
Conference (Feb. 27, 2007) (discussing this methodology).   
 in that compensation 
would have to be available for participation in quasi-legislative 
and quasi-adjudicatory proceedings in state and local proceedings 
and selectively in federal rulemaking and administrative 
adjudication. Compensation would flow initially to the 
 221. See CAL. PUB. UTIL.CODE § 1801 (West 2009); 65-407-840 ME. CODE R. § 7 
(Weil 2009). 
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participant, not the attorneys, and include compensation for 
experts and the true out-of-pocket expenses of the participants.  
The effort would not be inexpensive.  In some cases, such as those 
involving regulated industries, provision of municipal services, or 
other arenas that administer ratepayer funds or funds from fees 
or services, compensation could flow from the subject fund or 
regulated entity.  In many proceedings, the expense would come 
from the budget of the agency sponsoring the proceeding, and in 
those circumstances would ultimately be born by the taxpayer.  A 
few states undertake this effort in public utility commission 
proceedings under the theory that, where the public already pays 
for utility representation, it serves the process and the public to 
provide similar support to intervenors.222
I believe that in the current political climate such a broadly 
based system likely would be infeasible, especially at the local 
level except in those cases where the cost could be transferred to 
a well-funded project proponent or a special-fund effort.  A 
serious effort at such democratization of representation through 
subsidy of attorneys and experts was attempted in the 1970’s, but 
rolled back during the Reagan presidency precisely because of its 
successes.
 
223
CONCLUSION 
  Nonetheless, it is what we must do if we truly want 
to democratize our administrative state. 
Governance in modern industrial democracy is complex, and 
environmental governance is especially complex.  Effective 
participation in environmental governance requires expertise and 
representation.  The difficulties and expense of providing such 
 
 222. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL.CODE § 1801.3(d) (West 2009). These statutes 
present many difficulties, of which the most serious is the need for citizen 
advocates to front the cost of experts and attorneys until the end of the 
proceeding. Even where the statutes provide for an early determination of 
eligibility for compensation, the amount and the final approval occur at the 
conclusion and depend on various standards, typically based on subjective 
determination of the contribution of the party to the proceeding. 
 223. Some legislative remnants of the effort remain. See Federal Advisory 
Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. 1 § 7(d)(1)(a) (2006) (permitting payment to 
intervenors at the hourly rate equal to a Federal civil service rating of GS-18). 
These provisions remain, but are largely unused. See also 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) 
(2006) (provision for compensation of successful litigants against the 
government in limited circumstance). 
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expertise to lay participants should not mask its necessity to a 
vibrant democracy. The archetype of self-sufficient and 
unassisted citizen participation contributes an intellectually 
counter-productive disconnect between the ideal of participation 
and the realities of modern life, between our agrarian and anti-
intellectual heritage and the complex industrial society in which 
we all participate.  The assertion that public participation is alive 
and well in the absence of assistance by experts and attorneys 
also advantages those whose interests are served by minimizing 
the effects of disparity in resources.  If public participation 
matters, we must begin with the understanding that it becomes 
most truly effective when conjoined with representation and 
expertise. 
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